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INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, GENERAL FEDERAL 
LAWS, AND THE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION: 
AN OVERVIEW AND UPDATE 
 
Bryan H. Wildenthal * 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This article focuses on the application within Indian 
country of federal regulatory laws—typically dealing with labor 
relations, employment, health, the environment, or other social and 
economic issues—and their impact on Indian Nation governments 
and tribal enterprises. Such laws are often described as “federal 
law[s] of general applicability,”1 or as I would put it more simply, 
“general federal laws” (GFLs). Such laws are “general” in the 
sense that they are not specialized Indian legislation aimed 
primarily at tribal issues or concerns. Rather, they appear on their 
face to be relevant to all Americans, Indian or non-Indian, whether 
living within Indian country or not. This article takes the position 
that GFLs, just like specialized Indian legislation and all laws 
potentially affecting the ancient rights and sovereignty of Indian 
Nations, should be subjected to the rules of interpretation 
commonly known as the Indian law “canons of construction.”2 																																																																																																																												
* Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law (San Diego); J.D., 
Stanford Law School (see http://www.tjsl.edu/directory/bryan-h-wildenthal and 
http://ssrn.com/author=181791). I have regularly taught the course in American 
Indian Law at Thomas Jefferson since joining the faculty there in 1996. For 
much of that time, this has been the only such course taught by a full-time 
faculty member at any California law school south of Los Angeles. I also teach 
in the fields of constitutional law, civil procedure, and federal courts, among 
others, and have written a college textbook, NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 
ON TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH CASES, LAWS, AND DOCUMENTS (ABC-CLIO, 
2003), along with numerous articles in leading law reviews on subjects 
including constitutional law and history, American Indian law, and the rights of 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people. I dedicate this article to my 
beloved husband, Ashish Agrawal. He encouraged me to accept the invitation to 
speak at the 2015 ILC (see note 3) and has always unstintingly supported my 
scholarly endeavors. 
1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al. 
eds., LexisNexis, 2012), § 2.03, at 123. 
2 See generally Part II; COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.02, at 
113−23, and § 2.03, at 123−28. On the definition of a GFL, see Bryan H. 
Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of 
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 In April 2015, I completed a much shorter version of this 
article in connection with my presentation at the Federal Bar 
Association’s 40th Annual Indian Law Conference.3 I previously 
published two major articles on this subject in the Oregon Law 
Review (2007) and Michigan State Law Review (2008).4 Many 
other scholars have undertaken valuable studies of this area. In 
particular, no discussion of the subject should proceed without 
acknowledging the crucial articles by Professor Alex Tallchief 
Skibine (1991) and Professor Vicki Limas (1994), and the treatise 
by Kaighn Smith, Jr. (2011), a leading practitioner in the field.5 
See also the prescient early article by Joseph J. Brecher (1977).6 
Even eight years before the notorious decision by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal 
Farm (1985) (“Coeur d’Alene”),7 Brecher accurately perceived and 
anticipated the emerging trends. 
 This article updates my 2007 and 2008 articles. It reviews 
some key points about the Ninth Circuit’s remarkable three-judge 																																																																																																																												
Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 493, 499−502 (2007) (hereinafter Wildenthal 
2007). 
3 Federal Bar Association, 40th Annual Indian Law Conference: Conference 
Materials 342 (April 9−10, 2015). The theme of the 2015 ILC, held at Talking 
Stick Resort, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community (near Scottsdale, 
Arizona), was “Forty Years Strong: The Indian Self-Determination Era 
Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty.” The article grew out of my participation on 
Plenary Panel 6, “Standing Strong: Inherent Tribal Governmental Status” (April 
10, 2015). 
4 Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2; Bryan H. Wildenthal, How the Ninth Circuit 
Overruled a Century of Supreme Court Indian Jurisprudence—And Has So Far 
Gotten Away With It, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 547 (2008) (hereinafter 
Wildenthal 2008); see also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf 
Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical State of 
American Indian Law, 38 TULSA L. REV. 113 (2002) (hereinafter Wildenthal 
2002) (offering several wide-ranging observations on Indian law). 
5 Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes 
and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (1991); Limas, Application 
of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes: 
Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 
(1994); see also SMITH, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
(2011). Professor Skibine made another important contribution to this field with 
his recent article, Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal 
Regulatory Laws to Indian Nations, 21 WASH. & LEE. J. CIV. RTS. & SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 123 (2016). 
6 Brecher, Federal Regulatory Statutes and Indian Self-Determination: Some 
Problems and Proposed Legislative Solutions, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 285 (1977). 
7 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that general federal laws should 
presumptively apply to on-reservation Indian Nation employment and other 
activities). 
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panel opinion in Coeur d’Alene, which—for more than thirty years 
now—has frustrated lawyers in Indian country and out-muscled the 
Supreme Court itself in influencing other lower-court rulings on 
how to interpret GFLs in relation to Indian country. Coeur d’Alene 
effectively overruled—in many federal circuits and for many 
GFLs—the weight of more than a century of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the Indian law canons of construction. 
 This article also reviews some aspects of the notorious San 
Manuel cases. In that litigation, the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB or Board) in 2004, and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2007, incoherently deployed 
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine to extend the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) to on-reservation employment by tribal 
government-owned gaming enterprises—even though Congress 
never authorized or intended such an extension.8 That specific 
issue of federal labor law, and the broader dispute over Coeur 
d’Alene, emerged again in 2015 with appeals to the Sixth and 
Tenth Circuits over application of the NLRA to tribal casinos.9 The 
appeals were resolved by three important decisions discussed in 
Part V of this article: one by the NLRB (effectively mooting the 
Tenth Circuit appeal) and two by the Sixth Circuit. 
 Part II discusses the classical canons of construction 
governing Indian law and contrasts them with the perverse and 
ill-conceived Coeur d’Alene doctrine which has flourished in the 
lower federal courts. Part III highlights the stunning degree of 
irony—not to mention outright defiance of the Supreme Court—in 
the lower courts’ treatment of the Supreme Court’s 1960 decision 																																																																																																																												
8 San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055 (2004), enforced by 
San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007); see generally Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2. 
9 The Sixth Circuit appeals, brought by two Indian Nations in Michigan, 
challenged the NLRB’s assertions of jurisdiction in Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (2014) (concerning the Little River Casino 
Resort), and Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (2014) 
(operated by the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe). District courts in the Sixth 
Circuit had rejected preliminary challenges to NLRB jurisdiction in Little River 
Band of Ottawa Indians v. NLRB, 747 F. Supp. 2d 872 (WD MI 2010), and 
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. NLRB, 838 F. Supp. 2d 598 (ED MI 2011). 
The Tenth Circuit appeal challenged Chickasaw Nation, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 163 
(2013) (asserting jurisdiction over Chickasaw’s WinStar World Casino). A 
district court in the Tenth Circuit had initially enjoined the NLRB from asserting 
jurisdiction, in Chickasaw Nation v. NLRB, No. CIV-11-506-W (WD OK, July 
11, 2011), but a partial settlement allowed the NLRB to proceed with a limited 
assertion of jurisdiction, subject to the appeal. 
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in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.10 Part 
IV discusses continuing struggles over the Coeur d’Alene doctrine 
in the lower federal courts. Finally, Part V discusses the 2015 
decisions and where things have gone from there. 
 
II.    COMPETING CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 
 
 The Ninth Circuit in Coeur d’Alene held that a GFL, even 
if silent on the issue, presumptively applies to Indian tribes unless 
the tribe shows that (1) it intrudes on “purely intramural” tribal 
self-government, (2) it conflicts with an “explicit” or “specific” 
tribal-treaty right, or (3) Congress affirmatively intended it not to 
apply.11 
 By contrast, the classical Indian law canons of construction, 
developed and reiterated in a multitude of Supreme Court decisions 
from 1832 to 2014, require that courts (1) construe treaties and 
agreements with tribes as the Indians themselves would have 
understood them, including broadly implied tribal rights even in 
the absence of explicit or specific treaty language (the “treaty 
canon”), (2) construe treaties, statutes, and other sources of law 
liberally in favor of Indians, so as to resolve any ambiguities or 
uncertainties in their favor (the “ambiguity canon”), and (3) 
construe federal statutes not to abrogate or limit tribal sovereign 
rights (including but not limited to treaty rights), rather to preserve 
them, unless Congress clearly intended such laws to limit such 
rights (the “congressional intent canon”). Among the most 
important landmark cases supporting those canons are Worcester v. 
Georgia (1832) (in an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall),12 
United States v. Winans (1905),13 Yakima County v. Yakima Indian 
Nation (1992),14 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians (1999),15 and, most recently, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community (2014).16 																																																																																																																												
10 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
11 Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115−16 (setting forth basic “rule” and three 
“exceptions”); see also id. at 1117 (discussing whether any treaty “explicitly” or 
“specifically” protects a relevant tribal right). 
12 31 U.S. 515, 551−56 (1832); see also id. at 563, 582 (McLean, J., concurring). 
13 198 U.S. 371, 380−84 (1905). 
14 502 U.S. 251, 258, 269 (1992). 
15 526 U.S. 172, 193−208 (1999). 
16 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030−32 (2014). 
 
 
103	
 The Court’s 1999 Mille Lacs decision systematically 
applied the classical canons to an 1837 treaty, an 1850 presidential 
executive order,17 an 1855 treaty,18 and the 1858 act of Congress 
admitting Minnesota to statehood.19 This case has not received 
nearly the attention it deserves. In 2002, I published one of the first 
discussions in the law review literature of Mille Lacs and its 
application of the canons—also discussing Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist’s shocking dissent from the 5-4 decision—and noting 
the similar analysis (effectively equivalent to the canons) in Idaho 
v. United States (2001).20 
 The 1992 Yakima case illustrates the degree of consensus 
on the modern Supreme Court supporting the overall force and 
applicability of the canons. Justice Antonin Scalia—generally 
known as hostile to Indian claims—wrote for an 8-1 majority 
applying both the congressional intent and ambiguity canons. 
While the case did not involve a GFL, Justice Scalia declared 
broadly that “[w]hen we are faced with …  two possible 
constructions [of federal law], our choice between them must be 
dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian 
jurisprudence: [the ambiguity canon].”21 Justice Harry Blackmun, 																																																																																																																												
17 Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 16, at 193–95 & n. 5 (discussing 1837 treaty and 1850 
order). 
18 Id. at 195−202. 
19 Id. at 202−08. 
20 533 U.S. 262 (2001). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 
at 208−20 (joined by Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.) was truly outrageous 
and merits more extended treatment than I have yet been able to provide. The 
same four justices, again led by Rehnquist, also dissented in Idaho, 533 U.S. at 
281−88. See Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 131−35 (discussing Mille Lacs 
and Idaho); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 495 & n. 258, 499 & n. 270 
(discussing Idaho); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 5, at 587−88 & nn. 215-18 
(discussing Mille Lacs and Idaho). On Mille Lacs, see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
(2012), supra note 1, § 2.02[1], at 115-16; id. § 2.03, at 123, and on Idaho, id. § 
2.02[3], at 119−20. 
21 Yakima, 502 U.S. at 269; see also id. at 258 (quoting and applying the 
congressional intent canon). It is understood that “ambiguity” (while often used 
loosely in common parlance) is not exactly synonymous with “vagueness” or 
“uncertainty.” Strictly speaking—as suggested by Justice Scalia’s reference 
quoted in the text to “two possible constructions”—“ambiguous” connotes a 
duality of possible meaning. The canon at issue (sometimes expressed as two 
closely related canons) supports sympathetic construction of any indeterminate 
text. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.02[1], at 113 & nn. 2−3 
(referring not only to “ambiguities” but also to “doubtful expressions” construed 
“generously” or “liberally” in favor of Indians). It is nevertheless most often 
described in terms of “ambiguity,” and for reasons of convenient economy this 
article follows that style. 
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the only (partial) dissenter, emphatically endorsed the Court’s 
restatement of the canons and complained only that it failed to 
apply them vigorously enough in favor of the tribe.22 Thus, Yakima 
stands as a resounding and unanimous modern reaffirmation of the 
classical canons—at least by the Supreme Court. 
 Four notable Supreme Court decisions during the 1980s 
forthrightly applied the canons to a series of garden-variety GFLs: 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982) (applying the ambiguity 
and congressional intent canons to, inter alia, the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978),23 Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla 
Band of Mission Indians (1984) (applying the congressional intent 
canon to the Federal Power Act),24 United States v. Dion (1986) 
(applying the congressional intent canon to the Eagle Protection 
Act),25 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante (1987) 
(applying the congressional intent canon to the federal diversity 
jurisdiction statute).26 Merrion predated Coeur d’Alene by almost 
three years and was actually discussed by the Ninth Circuit in 
Coeur d’Alene, though in an astonishingly misleading way that 
ignored and evaded Merrion’s reaffirmation and use of the 
canons.27 The Supreme Court itself has not forgotten those cases. It 
cited Dion and Iowa Mutual with approval in its 2014 Bay Mills 
decision.28 
 I have argued that the Mille Lacs and Idaho cases, along 
with the decisions almost a century earlier in Winans (1905) and 
Winters v. United States (1908),29 may also be viewed as examples 
of the Supreme Court applying the canons to GFLs, on the ground 
that the statehood enabling and admission acts at issue are properly 
viewed as such. Statehood acts are not specialized Indian 
legislation. They have general and national impact, not just on the 
state admitted.30 Concededly, however, the interaction between 																																																																																																																												
22 Yakima, 502 U.S. at 270−78 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
23 455 U.S. 130, 149−52 (1982). 
24 466 U.S. 765, 767−69, 781–87 (1984). 
25 476 U.S. 734, 738−46 (1986). 
26 480 U.S. 9, 17−18 (1987). 
27 See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 573−79. 
28 Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2032. 
29 207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also Winans, 198 U.S. 371; Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 
172; Idaho, 533 U.S. 262. 
30 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 493−502; see also supra note 20 (citing 
Idaho and discussing Mille Lacs). 
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statehood acts and Indian rights may be viewed by some as a 
distinctive issue unlikely to control judicial interpretation of GFLs 
dealing with labor, employment, the environment, and the like.31 																																																																																																																												
31 My 2007 article appears to have had an impact on the leading treatise in the 
field of American Indian law. It is prominently cited at the outset of a key 
section of COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.03, at 123 n. 2, one of 
only three law review articles cited in that section, see id. at 124 n. 13 (citing 
Skibine 1991, supra note 5, 126 n. 23 (citing Limas, supra note 5), Indeed, that 
section—which focuses on the interaction of the canons with GFLs—appears to 
have been carefully rewritten for the 2012 edition in direct response to my 2007 
article, which offered some criticisms (reluctant and sympathetic) of the 2005 
edition’s treatment of the case law analyzing GFLs. Compare COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.03, at 123−28, with COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis, 2005), § 
2.03, at 128−32; see also Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 480−86; Wildenthal 
2008, supra note 4, at 569−71. 
I had expressed puzzlement, for example, that § 2.03 in the 2005 
edition cited Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99, prominently in the text (albeit with 
criticisms and caveats), as providing the main rule, while Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 
was relegated to a later pair of footnotes as merely illustrating an exception to 
the Tuscarora “presumption.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2005), § 2.03, at 129−30 
nn. 102−03; see also Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99; Part III (discussing Tuscarora). 
Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, was not mentioned at all in § 2.03 (though amply 
discussed in § 2.02), and neither Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, nor Iowa Mutual, 480 
U.S. 9, was discussed or even cited in §§ 2.02 or 2.03. The 2005 edition did, 
however, cite Escondido (though like Dion, only in a footnote) as an example of 
the canons being applied to a GFL. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2005), § 2.03, at 129 
n. 95; see also Escondido, 466 U.S. 765. The 2012 edition now states clearly 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has long applied the Indian law canons to statutes of 
general applicability” (citing my 2007 article, supra note 2), and starts with 
Dion in the main text as “[t]he leading modern case taking this approach,” 
followed by prominent discussion in the text of Mille Lacs and Iowa Mutual. 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.03, at 123 & ns. 2−7. And the 
2012 edition again properly cites Escondido as a GFL canons case. Id. at 124 n. 
11. Oddly, however, Merrion—widely acknowledged as an extremely important 
Indian law precedent and otherwise cited dozens of times throughout the Cohen 
treatise—is still mysteriously absent from §§ 2.02 and 2.03. Merrion’s important 
reaffirmation of the canons, particularly as to GFLs, continues to be strangely 
invisible to many judges and commentators (as discussed further in the text). 
Also, as I noted with regard to the 2005 edition, see Wildenthal 2007, 
supra note 2, at 485−86; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 570, chapter 10 of 
the 2012 edition continues to assert flatly that “federal environmental laws apply 
in Indian country unless they interfere with tribal self-government or conflict 
with treaty or statutory rights, or unless Congress intended to exclude Indian 
lands from the reach of the statute.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, 
§ 10.01[2][a], at 785. The 2012 edition, just like the 2005 edition, merely cites 
Coeur d’Alene (with a general cross-reference to § 2.03) to support that 
sweeping endorsement of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. Id. at 785 n. 6.; see also 
Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113. This remains inconsistent with the reasoning of 
Dion (still not discussed or even cited in chapter 10), not to mention many other 
Supreme Court cases. Dion, of course, was a 1986 Supreme Court decision that 
actually dealt with the application to Indian country of a federal environmental 
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 All four of the key Supreme Court decisions of the 1980s 
applying the canons to GFLs—Merrion, Escondido, Dion, and 
Iowa Mutual—were cited on point in briefs provided to the D.C. 
Circuit in the 2007 San Manuel case. Merrion, Escondido, and 
Iowa Mutual were also cited on point in the NLRB’s published 
opinions reviewed in San Manuel.32 That did not prevent Judge 
Janice Rogers Brown, the author of the D.C. Circuit San Manuel 
opinion, from denying that any such cases were brought to her 
court’s attention. She made the surprising claim that “[w]e have 
found no case in which the Supreme Court applied this [ambiguity] 
principle of pro-Indian construction . . . [to] a statute of general 
application.”33 
 Despite the publication of my article later in 2007 pointing 
out the D.C. Circuit’s error in this regard, D.C. Circuit Judge 
David Tatel repeated this odd confession of inability to perform 
basic legal research in his 2011 opinion in El Paso Natural Gas 
Co. v. United States.34 The first time might be excusable as a 
mistake. For the court to reiterate this factually false claim about 
the Supreme Court’s case law, after being called on it in a 
published and readily available law review article, is deeply 
disappointing. Perhaps the D.C. Circuit judges should hire as law 
clerks some graduates of Thomas Jefferson School of Law who 
																																																																																																																												
law. Dion would thus seem both to outrank and to be more on-point than Coeur 
d’Alene—an earlier decision by a lower court that did not address an 
environmental law! Chapters 17 and 18 on “natural resources” and “hunting, 
fishing, and gathering rights,” in both the 2005 and 2012 editions, do 
extensively cite Dion. But that merely underscores the oddity of its absence 
from chapter 10, the leading section on environmental law in Indian country. 
Chapter 10 goes on to note that, “[w]ith limited exceptions, federal 
environmental statutes now specifically address the role of Indian tribes as 
regulators, providing clear congressional intent that those laws apply to Indian 
country.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 10.01[2][a], at 785. That, 
of course, reflects proper respect for the classical Indian law canons. All the 
more reason, then, to avoid needlessly suggesting the sweeping validity of a 
lower-court doctrine contrary to the canons and never yet endorsed by the 
Supreme Court. 
32 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 467−68 & nn. 167-68, 476 nn. 193−95, 
479 n. 205. 
33 San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312; but see Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 
475−80. 
34 632 F.3d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312; 
but see Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 475−80. Distressingly, this factually 
false claim was repeated by the Sixth Circuit in its 2015 opinion deciding the 
Little River appeal. See supra note 9; infra Part V.C.3. 
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have taken my American Indian Law course. They can find the 
cases! 
 Compounding San Manuel’s mistake by suggesting that the 
ambiguity canon applies only to laws with a specialized focus on 
Indian affairs (not to GFLs),35 El Paso Natural Gas took that error 
a troubling step further by claiming the canon “applies only to 
statutes” enacted to benefit tribes.36 Actually adopting such a rule 
would require overruling numerous Supreme Court precedents. It 
would be a deeply disruptive curtailment of the canons and 
expansion of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. It is certainly important 
under the canons to construe laws intended to benefit Indians in a 
liberal manner, to make sure their beneficial goals are fully 
achieved. But it is even more important to apply the canons to laws 
that concededly (to some extent) limit tribal rights—or that may 
appear silent or mostly indifferent to Indian concerns, like GFLs. 
Such laws might otherwise be read to erode tribal rights more than 
Congress intended. Such laws are in particular need of 
interpretation through the protective lens of the canons.37 
 El Paso Natural Gas based its suggested narrowing of the 
Indian law canons on a stunningly erroneous misreading of a 1918 
Supreme Court case, Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States.38 																																																																																																																												
35 See supra note 33. 
36 El Paso Natural Gas, 632 F.3d at 1278 (emphasis added). What made this all 
the more regrettable was that the canons did not properly apply to this case in 
the first place. The court declined to apply the ambiguity canon to the Uranium 
Mill Tailings Remediation and Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) (as requested 
by the Navajo Nation, an intervenor in the litigation), noting that it was a GFL 
designed “to protect public health in general rather than tribal health in 
particular.” Id.; see also id. at 1273−76. More to the point was that the 
UMTRCA did not limit tribal sovereignty in any way, and the provisions at 
issue did not relate to any distinct rights of Indians or tribes. See id. at 1278−79. 
The mere fact that an Indian Nation was seeking a generally available potential 
benefit under such a GFL (here, cleanup of a uranium mining site) did not 
provide any basis to invoke the canons. As explained by COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
(2012), supra note 1: “The canons will not apply when the interpretive question 
is one that might be posed by an ordinary litigant and has nothing to do with the 
distinct rights of Indians and tribes.” Id., § 2.03, at 123−24; see also id. at 124 & 
ns. 8−9 (briefly noting El Paso Natural Gas’s mistakenly restricted view of the 
canons). 
37 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 493 (noting well established doctrine 
that Indian law canons apply “to laws designed both to benefit Indians and to 
undermine Indian rights,” lack of “any logical basis for exempting laws that 
appear, at first blush, indifferent to Indian concerns” [i.e., GFLs], and that any 
such exemption “would be a peculiar ‘donut hole’ in the analysis”). 
38 248 U.S. 78 (1918); see also El Paso Natural Gas, 632 F.3d at 1278, citing 
Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89. 
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The brief and unanimous opinion in Alaska Pacific was devoted to 
a straightforward application of the ambiguity canon to a law 
setting aside several islands as a reservation for an Alaska Indian 
tribe. The Court held that the reservation included the adjacent 
waters and fishing grounds and stated that “statutes passed for the 
benefit of dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be 
liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of 
the Indians.”39 The case obviously involved a law intended to 
benefit Indians and did not concern or mention any laws limiting 
tribal rights. While the case reaffirmed that the canons do apply to 
beneficial legislation, there is nothing in Alaska Pacific restricting 
any of the canons only to that category of laws. 
 El Paso Natural Gas’s contrary assertion rips Alaska 
Pacific out of context and flies in the face of numerous far more 
recent Supreme Court precedents that have clearly and 
emphatically applied the canons (including the ambiguity canon) to 
laws partly or largely designed to limit tribal rights. Such laws 
include both GFLs and specialized Indian legislation. Of the 
leading Supreme Court cases cited above, four applied the canons 
to such laws—and this is merely a small sampling: Escondido 
(1984),40 Dion (1986),41 Yakima (1992),42 and Bay Mills (2014).43 
 As my 2007 article noted, “the [Supreme] Court has often 
vigorously applied the canons even to specialized Indian 
legislation designed to undermine tribal sovereignty.”44 I cited in 
support of that point what is probably the most famous and 
important modern example of such a case, one that Judge Brown 
herself cited (among others) in San Manuel to support the point 
that “ambiguities in a federal statute must be resolved in favor of 
Indians”45—Bryan v. Itasca County (1976).46 
																																																																																																																												
39 Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89; see generally id. at 86−90. 
40 466 U.S. 765. 
41 476 U.S. 734. 
42 502 U.S. 251. 
43 134 S. Ct. 2024; see also Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 419 n. 14, 464 n. 
162 (citing more than two dozen Supreme Court cases applying the canons to 
various federal laws, many of them laws limiting tribal rights). 
44 Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 493. 
45 San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1311, citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 
(1976). 
46 Bryan, 426 U.S. 373, cited in Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 419 n. 14, 493 
n. 250. 
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 What El Paso Natural Gas missed is that the Supreme 
Court’s unanimous opinion in Bryan quoted the very same passage 
in Alaska Pacific, proving that its rule can hardly be limited to the 
context of “beneficial” Indian legislation.47 Bryan interpreted the 
federal law commonly known as “P.L. 280,” one of the most 
sweeping intrusions on tribal sovereignty enacted during the 
discredited Termination Era of 1943–61. P.L. 280 extended state 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal lands in several selected 
states.48 It has been bitterly resented by most Indian Nations and 
widely viewed as a disastrous experiment.49 Bryan strained 
mightily, perhaps even implausibly, to construe P.L. 280 favorably 
to tribal sovereignty, to carefully limit the law’s scope and effect. 
To do so, the Court deployed both the congressional intent canon 
and (quoting Alaska Pacific) the ambiguity canon.50 
 The Bryan Court could not have been more clear that it 
viewed itself as having long extended the rule quoted in Alaska 
Pacific to laws decidedly unfavorable to tribal interests. 
Immediately after quoting Alaska Pacific, it stated: “This principle 
of statutory construction has particular force in the face of claims 
that ambiguous statutes abolish by implication Indian tax 
																																																																																																																												
47 Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392, quoting Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89. 
48 Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 589 (1953), codified principally at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 
28 U.S.C. § 1360; see also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 377−80; COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
(2012), supra note 1, § 1.06, at 91−92. 
49 See, e.g., Duane Champagne & Carole Goldberg, Captured Justice: Native 
Nations and Public Law 280 (Carolina Academic Press, 2012); Carole 
Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian 
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997); Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 129 
(noting that P.L. 280 “has been intensely unpopular with both states and tribes . . 
. ever since it was passed at the height of the Termination Era,” and that “[s]tates 
have resented the costs of criminal jurisdiction over territories and peoples not 
otherwise subject to state taxation, and tribes have resented the consequent loss 
of sovereignty and intrusion by non-Indian state authorities into their affairs”). 
50 Bryan concluded that the civil-jurisdiction part of P.L. 280 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1360) did not authorize a state to tax on-reservation personal property 
owned by a tribal member. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375, 393; see also id. at 387−90 
(applying the congressional intent canon); id. at 390−93 (applying the ambiguity 
canon); id. at 392, quoting Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89. In California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), the Court held that the 
criminal-jurisdiction part of P.L. 280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162) did not 
authorize a state which allowed many forms of legal gambling to 
comprehensively apply its gambling prohibitions and regulations to tribally 
operated on-reservation gaming enterprises. While not explicitly reciting the 
canons itself, Cabazon relied heavily on Bryan’s interpretation of P.L. 280, 
which was explicitly governed by the canons. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207−12. 
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immunities.”51 The Court noted on the same page: “What we 
recently said of a claim that Congress had terminated an Indian 
reservation by means of an ambiguous statute is equally applicable 
here . . . .”52 
 Despite all this, it must be conceded that the Supreme 
Court, in an otherwise narrow and obscure 1993 decision, 
Negonsott v. Samuels,53 included dicta calling into question this 
broad reading of Bryan and the ambiguity canon. El Paso Natural 
Gas understandably overlooked Negonsott—it is very obscure 
even for Indian law specialists. Negonsott held that a 1940 federal 
law, the Kansas Act, which applied only to criminal jurisdiction 
over Indian country in Kansas,54 allowed the state to exercise 
concurrent state jurisdiction over certain crimes also within federal 
jurisdiction. The Court found the statutory text unambiguous,55 and 
Congress’s intent clear from the legislative history,56 and therefore 
found “no occasion to resort to [the ambiguity] canon of statutory 
construction.”57 Rather, the Court held, “for the reasons previously 
discussed, we think that the Kansas Act quite unambiguously 
confers jurisdiction on the State . . . .”58 																																																																																																																												
51 Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392, citing three more of its precedents: McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973), Squire v. Capoeman, 
351 U.S. 1, 6−7 (1956), and Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366−67 (1930). 
52 Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392−93. What the Court had “recently said” was that it 
would not infer that Congress had terminated a reservation, absent clear 
language or other evidence of congressional intent. I.e., the full traditional force 
of the canons would apply. See id. at 393, quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 
481, 504−05 (1973). 
53 507 U.S. 99 (1993); see also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 
IN A NUTSHELL 127 (West, 6th ed. 2015) (discussing Alaska Pacific, Bryan, and 
Negonsott’s dicta on the ambiguity canon). 
54 Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 103. 
55 Id. at 104−06. 
56 Id. at 106−09. 
57 Id. at 110. 
58 Id.; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 6.04[4][b], at 581 
(discussing Negonsott’s holding but not exploring its troubling dicta on the 
ambiguity canon). Another reason why Negonsott should not be viewed as 
having any importance on the broader issue of the Indian law canons is that 
cases on Indian country criminal jurisdiction fall within one of a few specialized 
categories where the canons have long been held not to apply with their usual 
force or regularity. Another example is federal tax legislation, where the Indian 
law canons may be overcome by a competing canon against unexpressed 
exemptions from taxation. There are some additional Supreme Court cases 
affecting Indian rights that have not applied the Indian law canons for various 
specialized reasons. But none of these cases has ever endorsed or even 
suggested anything like the Coeur d’Alene doctrine, nor have they suggested any 
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 In response to Negonsott’s (the tribal member criminal 
defendant’s) citation of Bryan and the ambiguity canon, however, 
the Negonsott Court offered some curiously unnecessary, 
tendentious, and misleading statements. Whether the author of the 
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, was being mischievous or merely 
careless is not entirely clear. He was well known as an almost 
relentless enemy of Indian sovereignty.59 It seems he may have 
taken the opportunity of a unanimous, highly technical, and 
apparently uncontroversial decision to kick up some dust about the 
scope of the Indian law canons. This was the same Chief Justice 
Rehnquist who made several arguments profoundly contrary to the 
canons and deeply hostile to Indian rights, in his outrageous 
dissent in Mille Lacs.60 
 Responding to counsel for Negonsott’s accurate and widely 
used paraphrase of the ambiguity canon—“that ‘laws must be 
liberally construed to favor Indians’”61—Rehnquist scolded: “What 
we actually said in Bryan, was that ‘statutes passed for the benefit 
of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, 
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.’”62 
Rehnquist went on: “It is not entirely clear to us that the Kansas 
Act is a statute ‘passed for the benefit of dependent Indian 
tribes.’”63 
 One cannot argue with Rehnquist’s last statement quoted 
above. As an extension of state jurisdiction into Indian country, the 
Kansas Act is exactly the kind of law (like P.L. 280) long viewed 
by most Indian Nations as deeply hostile to tribal sovereignty. But 
note how Rehnquist neatly skipped over the similarity of the 
Kansas Act to P.L. 280, the very law subjected to the ambiguity 
canon in Bryan, the very case which Rehnquist falsely—and very 
ironically—scolded Negonsott’s counsel for misciting. As noted 
above, what the Court “actually said in Bryan” (an opinion 
Rehnquist himself joined) included some very important and 																																																																																																																												
undermining of the ambiguity canon along the lines suggested by El Paso 
Natural Gas, 632 F.3d 1272, or the Negonsott dicta. See Wildenthal 2007, supra 
note 2, at 434 n. 59, 468−69 n. 170, 487−89 & nn. 233−37. 
59 See, e.g., Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 124−35 (discussing “The 
Rehnquist Era of American Indian Law”). 
60 See supra notes 17−20 and accompanying text. 
61 Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 110 (quoting petitioner’s, i.e., defendant’s, brief). 
62 Id., quoting Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392, quoting Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89 
(omitting here the second set of internal quotation marks). 
63 Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 110. 
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relevant additional statements that Rehnquist misleadingly ignored 
and omitted in Negonsott. It was Chief Justice Rehnquist, not 
counsel for Negonsott, who needed correction about what Bryan 
said and held. 
 Rehnquist was still not quite finished. Apparently seeking 
to drive a wedge between Negonsott, the tribal member criminal 
defendant, and the broader concerns of Negonsott’s tribe (the 
Kickapoo) and other Indian Nations, he stated: “We see no reason 
to equate ‘benefit of dependent Indian tribes,’ as that language is 
used in Bryan, with ‘benefit of accused Indian criminals,’ without 
regard to the interests of the victims of these crimes or of the tribe 
itself.”64 
 This was an outrageous cheap shot for Rehnquist to take. It 
ignored the reality that intrusions on Indian sovereignty very often 
affect both the purely personal interests of individual Indians and 
the broader sovereign interests of their tribes and of all Indian 
Nations—much as Bryan and the state tax it struck down affected 
not just the purely personal financial interest of Russell Bryan, but 
the sovereign interests of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe and by 
extension all Indian Nations.65 
 It was also stunningly hypocritical and suggested a 
disturbing racial double standard. As my 2002 article noted, 
“Rehnquist, never known as a staunch defender of the rights of 
criminal defendants,”66 nevertheless solicitously invoked the rights 
and liberties of non-Indian defendants in writing the Court’s 
infamous opinion granting non-Indians special protection from 
prosecution by Indian Nations for crimes committed within tribal 
territory.67 Rehnquist implicitly equated United States citizens only 
with non-Indians, ignored the fact that tribal member Indians are 
also United States citizens, and indifferently consigned Indians to 
the very same tribal justice he deemed inadequate for non-Indians 
choosing to commit on-reservation crimes. He “suggested no 
concern whatsoever for their [tribal members’] rights and 
liberties.”68 																																																																																																																												
64 Id. 
65 See supra note 50 (discussing holding and reasoning of Bryan). 
66 Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 127. 
67 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), discussed in 
Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 126−28. 
68 Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 127 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 
126−28. 
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 Shameful—but fortunately, as noted, these mischievous 
and disturbing comments in Rehnquist’s Negonsott opinion were 
clearly dicta, not affecting the Court’s holding and thus devoid of 
any precedential force. For the reasons stated, they should also be 
viewed as lacking any persuasive value whatsoever. We may hope 
the Bay Mills Court’s unqualified reaffirmation of the canons in 
2014 has laid them to rest.69 
 
III.      THE IRONY OF TUSCARORA 
 
 The sole Supreme Court authority cited by Coeur d’Alene 
to support its anti-canonical rule was a brief, passing statement in 
one of the most reviled Indian law decisions of the 20th century, 
the 1960 Tuscarora decision. The majority in Tuscarora held that 
the Federal Power Act (FPA) authorized the seizure and flooding 
of a large portion of the Tuscarora Indian Nation’s land.70 The 
disputed Tuscarora statement—that GFLs presumptively apply to 
“Indians and their property interests”—was an unnecessary, 
alternative, and seemingly secondary ground for the Tuscarora 
decision.71 The Supreme Court itself has never even cited that 
statement, let alone relied upon it, in the 57 years since. Supreme 
Court justices have been fonder of quoting Justice Hugo Black’s 
powerful dissent in Tuscarora.72 
 The primary ground for the decision, set forth at much 
greater length by the Tuscarora Court itself, was that Congress 																																																																																																																												
69 See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030−32. 
70 Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115, citing Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116; see also 
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 452−54 (discussing Tuscarora); Wildenthal 
2008, supra note 4, at 572−73 (criticizing Coeur d’Alene’s misuse of 
Tuscarora). 
71 The disputed statement, that “a general statute in terms applying to all persons 
includes Indians and their property interests,” appeared in Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 
at 116 (the page almost always cited on this point), and was repeated in 
substance four pages later, id. at 120 (“general Acts of Congress apply to 
Indians as well as to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the 
contrary”). 
72 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 466 & n. 164. Justice Black’s dissent is 
famously eloquent and concluded with the memorable statement: “Great nations, 
like great men, should keep their word.” Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 142 (Black, J., 
joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Wildenthal 2007, 
supra note 2, at 454 & n. 124 (quoting more extensively from the moving final 
page of Justice Black’s dissent, and commenting on a poignant memory that 
passage always brings to my mind, from when I was first interviewed by Judge 
Frank M. Johnson, Jr., for whom I clerked after law school). 
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allegedly did in fact intend for the FPA to authorize the seizure of 
tribal land—a debatable conclusion (producing a horribly unjust 
result), but a classic application of the Indian law canons.73 In the 
1984 Escondido decision (another FPA case), the Supreme Court 
cited Tuscarora specifically with regard to the 1960 decision’s 
canonical analysis of Congress’s intent. The Escondido Court 
conspicuously never quoted or mentioned (nor has any other 
Supreme Court case) the anti-canonical Tuscarora statement on 
which Coeur d’Alene leaned so heavily, even though it would have 
provided useful support for Escondido’s anti-tribal conclusion. 
Escondido did not even cite the two pages on which the disputed 
Tuscarora statement appeared.74 
 There have been exactly two relevant occasions on which 
the Supreme Court (in any majority opinion) has ever cited any 
aspect at all of its own majority opinion in Tuscarora. Both 
citations strongly suggest the Supreme Court long ago repudiated 
the disputed Tuscarora statement. The first citation was in 
Escondido, exactly eight months to the day before Coeur d’Alene 
was decided—but ignored by the Ninth Circuit. The second 
citation was in 1985, less than two months after Coeur d’Alene.75 
Beyond that, more than two dozen other Supreme Court decisions 
																																																																																																																												
73 See Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 111−14, and especially 118 (relying extensively 
on purported evidence of Congress’s intent in the relevant FPA provisions, 
including specific references to Indians). 
74 See Escondido, 466 U.S. at 786, citing Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 118 (not 116 or 
120), to reaffirm that Congress intended to apply the FPA to tribal lands; see 
also note 71; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 467−70. 
75 See Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248 n. 21 (1985), 
citing Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99 generally (without any specific page citation) as 
one of three cases that were “relied upon by [Oneida County]” to oppose the 
tribal claim at issue there. The Oneida Court rejected that use of all three. One 
case, it noted, “expressly reaffirmed” the canons. Tuscarora and the other case, 
it stated, “do so implicitly.” Id. The Oneida Court thus rejected the idea that 
Tuscarora may properly be viewed as standing for any anti-canonical principle 
of Indian law. See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 470−71; Wildenthal 2008, 
supra note 4, at 581−82. Escondido, 466 U.S. 765 was decided on May 15, 
1984, Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113 on January 15, 1985, and Oneida on March 
4, 1985. The third (and only other) citation by the Supreme Court of any aspect 
of the Tuscarora majority opinion, in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 
371, 415 (1980), is irrelevant for present purposes. It had nothing to do with 
how to interpret federal laws, but merely reaffirmed the point that Congress has 
the constitutional power to take even treaty-guaranteed Indian land for public 
use as long as just compensation is paid. See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 
466 & n. 165. 
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since 1960 have reaffirmed the canons while ignoring the Coeur 
d’Alene rule purportedly based on Tuscarora.76 
 Let’s be very clear about this: The Supreme Court has twice 
cited and discussed Tuscarora as simply one more in the long line 
of its own decisions applying the classical Indian law canons—
specifically, in Tuscarora, the congressional intent canon. 
Tuscarora and Escondido are part of that very line of cases. 
Moreover, in both cases the Supreme Court applied the canons to a 
quintessential GFL—the FPA! They thus join the other cases we 
saw in Part II, dating back 112 years, in which the Supreme Court 
has applied the canons or their effective equivalent to various 
GFLs. Here is the full list of all nine cases: Winans (1905), Winters 
(1908), Tuscarora (1960), Merrion (1982), Escondido (1984), 
Dion (1986), Iowa Mutual (1987), Mille Lacs (1999), and Idaho 
(2001).77 
 The contrary reading of Tuscarora, as repudiating the 
canons in the case of GFLs—celebrated coast-to-coast in the lower 
federal courts ever since Coeur d’Alene—has sunk without a trace 
in the Supreme Court’s case reports. Tuscarora, in fact, stands for 
the exact opposite of what Coeur d’Alene and its misbegotten 
progeny have claimed it does. And that has been clear since, at the 
very latest, the same year (1985) that Coeur d’Alene was decided! 
 Are the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, on this 
issue, operating in two parallel universes? Perhaps “Supreme” 
should be put in quotation marks instead of the italics I have 
intentionally used (with a touch of sardonic humor) in the previous 
five paragraphs and at other key points in this article. 
 It remains worrisome, however, that the Supreme Court, 
never shy about reversing the Ninth Circuit when it wants to (that 
circuit has been something of a punching bag for the Court),78 has 
allowed this bizarre state of affairs to persist for almost a third of a 
century now—including what is surely the longest-running 
unresolved federal circuit split on an important legal issue in 
American history.79 Of course, one factor has been the reluctance 																																																																																																																												
76 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 464−73. 
77 See supra notes 13, 29, 10, 23−26, 15, 20. 
78 See Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the 
Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405 (1998); Wildenthal 2008, 
supra note 4, at 551−52. 
79 Compare Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113 (holding that Occupational Safety 
and Health Act applies to tribal government employers) with Donovan v. Navajo 
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of tribes losing in the U.S. Court of Appeals to take cases to the 
Supreme Court.80 But one must be queasy about what will actually 
happen when the Supreme Court finally confronts the issue. 
 
IV.     CONTINUING STRUGGLES OVER COEUR D’ALENE 
 
 We must be skeptical of Coeur d’Alene’s self-description 
as embracing “three exceptions” to the purported “rule” derived 
from Tuscarora. That is misleading puffery designed to portray 
Coeur d’Alene as somehow moderate or balanced when it really is 
not.81 Consider the third Coeur d’Alene “exception” in particular, 
demanding proof that Congress affirmatively intended not to 
regulate tribes.82 It is the mirror-image opposite of the classical 
congressional intent canon. A tribe that can show that kind of 
evidence with regard to a federal law—that Congress clearly 
intended it not to regulate tribes—has no need of the protective 
shield of the canons in any event, at least not in that particular 
case. 
 The third so-called “exception” to the Coeur d’Alene rule is 
not really an “exception” at all, in any logical sense. Rather, it 
helps define the essential nature and scope of the rule itself. It 
would be as if a law imposing a general income tax contained two 
exceptions for specific types of exempted income, then added a 																																																																																																																												
Forest Products Industries, 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982) (contra). Reich v. 
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d. Cir. 1996), and Menominee 
Tribal Enterprises v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussed in Part IV), 
have sided with Coeur d’Alene on this point. See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, 
at 553−54 (discussing Mashantucket) and 555−57 (discussing Navajo Forest). 
80 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 529−30 (discussing the San Manuel 
Band’s decision not to appeal the 2007 D.C. Circuit San Manuel ruling, 475 
F.3d 1306); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 586 & n. 212 (discussing the 
remarkable fact that not a single one of six leading cases applying GFLs to tribes 
between 1985 and 2007, including Coeur d’Alene and San Manuel, was 
appealed to the Supreme Court). This trend continued from 2007 to 2015. At 
least two appellate decisions (prior to the 2015 Sixth Circuit rulings discussed in 
Part V) applied a GFL to a tribal or on-reservation business during that period, 
on the basis of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine—Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 
(9th Cir. 2009) (applying Fair Labor Standards Act to Indian-owned reservation 
business), and Menominee, 601 F.3d 669 (applying Occupational Safety and 
Health Act to tribal government-owned business). Neither was appealed to the 
Supreme Court. Both are discussed further in Part IV. As discussed in Part V.D, 
however, this trend was finally broken with the petitions for certiorari filed in 
February 2016 with regard to the 2015 Sixth Circuit decisions. 
81 See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 577−78. 
82 Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d  at 1116. 
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third “exception” stating (rather obviously and redundantly) that no 
tax would be owed if Congress repealed the entire law. The third 
Coeur d’Alene “exception” was always a necessary and logically 
implied corollary of the alleged Tuscarora rule about GFLs in the 
first place. Indeed, the second (mostly overlooked) statement of 
that disputed rule in Tuscarora explicitly articulated this very 
point, asserting that “general Acts of Congress apply to Indians as 
well as to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the 
contrary.”83 It is impossible to imagine the rule without this 
corollary. It would obviously be nonsensical for a court to apply a 
federal law to an Indian tribe if it was clear from that very law (and 
any related evidence) that Congress specifically intended it not to 
apply. 
 That leaves only the first and second Coeur d’Alene 
“exceptions” as having any real significance. While they may in 
some sense moderate the impact of the alleged Tuscarora “rule,” 
in realistic and practical terms the purported “rule” and its 
purported “exceptions” operate together as a single unified 
doctrine deeply inimical to tribal rights and profoundly subversive 
of the classical Indian law canons. 
 That is especially clear with regard to Coeur d’Alene’s 
“treaty exception,” which has had an insidiously corrosive effect 
on Indian sovereignty in two different ways.84 First, Coeur 
d’Alene’s focus on treaty rights has provided an all-too-convenient 
excuse to improperly denigrate and limit the sovereign rights of 
tribes that happen to lack extant treaties.85 Second, the insistence of 
Coeur d’Alene and its progeny that tribes demonstrate “explicit,” 
“specific,” or “express” treaty rights to escape the grip of any GFL 
is “wildly out of line with” the treaty canon itself, “the original 
historical bedrock of American Indian law,” given that canon’s 																																																																																																																												
83 Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added); see also supra note 71. I myself 
missed this interesting point in my 2007 and 2008 articles, as have Coeur 
d’Alene and its progeny, the Cohen treatise, and (to the best of my knowledge) 
all other academic commentators. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra 
note 1, § 2.03, at 124, 127. 
84 See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 577−81. 
85 But see Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 425−27, 438−40, 495−98 
(documenting the point that treaty rights are not required for a tribe to assert 
fully equal sovereign rights). Of course, the extant treaties, and the overall 
legacy of the Treaty Era of 1778−1868, do in important ways provide a 
collective historical and moral shield for all Indian Nations. See, e.g., COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 1.03[1], at 23−24. 
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requirement that treaties “be construed generously ‘as the Indians 
would have understood them.’”86 
 In the final analysis, exactly how damaging the Coeur 
d’Alene doctrine may be to Indian sovereignty depends on how 
broadly or narrowly courts construe each of the first two 
“exceptions.” There have been significant variations among the 
federal circuits in how the doctrine has played out. My 2008 
discussion of the lower-court case law,87 not comprehensive to 
begin with, is now somewhat out-of-date. A full treatment is 
beyond the scope of this article. Good surveys are provided in 
Cohen’s Handbook and Smith’s 2011 treatise on labor and 
employment law in Indian country.88 
 The Tenth Circuit remains the leader in defending the 
classical canons of construction. The 2-1 panel opinion by Judge 
Carlos Lucero in Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
(2010),89 seemed to resolve some of the confusion left over by the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan (2002).90 
Dobbs appeared to lean strongly against any expansion of the 																																																																																																																												
86 Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 580, quoting COHENS HANDBOOK (2005), 
supra note 1, § 2.02[1], at 119−20. 
87 As of 2008, six of the seven federal circuits to address the issue—the Second, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits—had generally embraced 
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 552−55. The 
D.C. Circuit in San Manuel, 475 F.3d 1306 had coyly denied doing so, while 
succumbing for all practical purposes. See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 
474−75, 502−11; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 554−55. The 2011 El Paso 
Natural Gas decision (cited supra note 34 and discussed in Part II) certainly 
seems to confirm the D.C. Circuit’s de facto adherence to Coeur d’Alene. 
88 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.03, at 124−27, and § 
21.02[5][c][i], at 1334−44; SMITH, supra note 5, at 114−72. Embracing the 
Coeur d’Alene doctrine does not invariably lead to rulings against tribal 
sovereignty, at least where the core protection of tribal sovereign immunity from 
private civil lawsuits is concerned. See, e.g., Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek 
Indians, 839 F.3d 1312, 1322−24 (11th Cir. 2016) (reaffirming Eleventh 
Circuit’s embrace of Coeur d’Alene doctrine generally); id. at 1317−18, 
1321−22, 1324−25 (also reaffirming, however, citing Supreme Court 
precedents, special protections for tribal sovereign immunity from private civil 
lawsuits, and concluding that federal laws such as the Americans With 
Disabilites Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not abrogate 
such immunity, even construed in light of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine); United 
States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, 862 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that an Indian tribe is not a “person” subject to suit under the False 
Claims Act, and remanding for consideration of whether an on-reservation 
college is an arm of the tribe). 
89 600 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010). 
90 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
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Coeur d’Alene doctrine and in favor of the traditional Indian law 
canons. 
 This was especially notable and heartening since Judge 
Lucero, in 2002, had declined to join the key section of the 
muddled but mostly pro-canons San Juan majority opinion. 
Instead, he joined a separate concurrence in San Juan by Judge 
Mary Beck Briscoe. They went along with the 9-1 en banc 
judgment, which upheld a tribal so-called “right to work” law 
against a claim that it was preempted by the NLRA. But they 
embraced the analytical framework set forth by the lone San Juan 
dissenter, Judge Michael Murphy, who flagrantly misconstrued 
key Supreme Court Indian law precedents and advocated a 
startlingly aggressive application of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.91 
 Dobbs involved the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA), as amended by Congress in the Pension Protection 
Act of 2006, which specified that ERISA applies to certain tribal 
insurance plans (for tribal employees engaged in “commercial 
activities”) but not others (for tribal employees engaged in 
“essential governmental functions”). Before the 2006 amendment, 
ERISA expressly exempted federal, state, and local governments, 
but was silent on tribal governments.92 
 Judge Lucero’s opinion in Dobbs adopted a broadly 
pro-tribal reading of San Juan and refused to apply the Coeur 
d’Alene doctrine to ERISA—albeit, rather oddly, without ever 
mentioning Coeur d’Alene itself. Dobbs held that even before the 
2006 amendment, “ERISA would not apply to insurance plans 
purchased by tribes for employees primarily engaged in 
governmental functions unless Congress expressly or necessarily 
preempted Indian tribal sovereignty.”93 By contrast, Judge 																																																																																																																												
91 See id. at 1200−01 (Briscoe, J., concurring, and Lucero, J., concurring); id. at 
1201−10 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 
559−69. While critical of many aspects of San Juan, my 2008 article praised 
some other Tenth Circuit decisions, see id. at 555−58, and noted that among the 
federal circuits, the Tenth stands alone in “mount[ing] significant resistance to 
the allure of Coeur d’Alene.” Id. at 555. Judge Lucero reaffirmed his 2002 
embrace of Coeur d’Alene in 2005, making his apparent (at least partial) 2010 
change of heart in Dobbs, 600 F.3d 1275 all the more interesting and significant. 
See supra note 94. 
92 See Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1278−79. 
93 Id. at 1284; see generally id. at 1283−84. Judge Lucero implicitly criticized 
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine, and suggested the Tenth Circuit had squarely 
rejected it, stating that “[i]n this circuit, respect for Indian sovereignty means 
that federal regulatory schemes do not apply to tribal governments exercising 
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Briscoe’s dissent—the same Judge Briscoe whom Judge Lucero 
had joined in San Juan in 2002—construed San Juan narrowly and 
applied the Coeur d’Alene doctrine (again without citing Coeur 
d’Alene itself) to find that ERISA had fully applied to tribal 
employers before the 2006 amendment.94 
 The Ninth Circuit in Solis v. Matheson (2009) and the 
Seventh Circuit in Menominee Tribal Enterprises v. Solis (2010), 
																																																																																																																												
their sovereign authority absent express congressional authorization.” Id. at 
1283. But he never cited Coeur d’Alene by name. In a footnote, he conceded 
that San Juan had drawn a distinction between a tribe’s authority as a 
“sovereign” as compared to its exercise of “property rights.” Id. at 1283 n. 8, 
quoting San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1199. This distinction in San Juan was merely 
stated in dicta, but in fact it distinguished a tribe’s “sovereign” authority not just 
from its role as “property” owner but more generally from its roles as either 
“employer or landowner.” San Juan, 276 F.3d  at 1199; see generally id. at 
1198−99; see also Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1293 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (correctly 
noting the broader reach of San Juan’s discussion in this regard, though failing 
to acknowledge it as dicta); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 560−61 
(criticizing San Juan’s dicta in this regard); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 
518 n. 331 (same). My 2007 article discussed and criticized at some length the 
artificial distinctions drawn in the San Manuel cases (cited supra note 8) 
between so-called “traditional” and “commercial” governmental functions, or 
between “governmental” and “proprietary” functions of governments, noting the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of such distinctions in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), among other cases. See 
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 518−21 (discussing Garcia); see generally id. 
at 511−26. 
94 Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1293−96 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). Judge Briscoe noted that 
Judge Lucero had reaffirmed his embrace of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine in 
Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah, 428 F.3d 966, 984 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(Lucero, J., concurring), cited in Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1293 (Briscoe, J., 
dissenting). Judge Lucero’s restatement of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine in 
Shivwits quoted Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1462−63 (10th Cir. 
1989), noting that Nero in turn quoted and relied upon Coeur d’Alene, 475 F.3d 
at 1116. See Shivwits at 984 (Lucero, J., concurring) (quoting Nero’s restatement 
of Coeur d’Alene’s so-called “three exceptions to Tuscarora’s rule”). When 
Judge Briscoe quoted Judge Lucero’s Shivwits concurrence, she retained his 
citation of Nero but dropped his citation of Coeur d’Alene and avoided any 
mention of Coeur d’Alene in her ensuing three pages of discussion and 
application of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. She instead referred to “the 
Tuscarora rule,” Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1294 (Briscoe, J., dissenting), and cited 
other cases following Tuscarora and Coeur d’Alene, see id. at 1293−96 
(Briscoe, J., dissenting). As noted in the text and note 93, Judge Lucero himself 
in Dobbs likewise chose to discuss and criticize the Coeur d’Alene doctrine 
without citing its foundational case (he did not cite Tuscarora either), thus 
creating the confusing paradox that Coeur d’Alene, though central to the issue in 
Dobbs, and in fact the key bone of contention between Judges Lucero and 
Briscoe, was never cited in Dobbs. 
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on the other hand, appeared to double down on their longstanding 
embrace of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.95 
 Menominee followed Coeur d’Alene’s specific holding in 
applying the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) to an 
on-reservation business owned by the Menominee tribal 
government. Judge Richard Posner’s application of Coeur 
d’Alene’s so-called “treaty exception” confirmed its especially 
troubling potential. My 2008 article praised Judge Posner for 
successfully “fight[ing] the undertow of the Coeur d’Alene treaty 
analysis” in an earlier Seventh Circuit case.96 In Menominee, 
unfortunately, it pulled him under.97 
 Matheson applied the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to 
a tribal-member-owned business on the Puyallup reservation. That 
was hardly surprising, since Coeur d’Alene remains governing 
precedent in the Ninth Circuit. But Matheson provided yet a 
further illustration of Coeur d’Alene’s corrosive impact on treaty 
rights.98 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																												
95 Matheson, 563 F.3d 425; Menominee, 601 F.3d 669  
96 Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 580, discussing Reich v. Great Lakes Indian 
Fish & Wildlife Commission, 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993). 
97 Distinguishing Navajo Forest, 692 F.2d 709, Judge Posner’s Menominee 
opinion noted specific treaty language limiting access of nonmembers of the 
tribe to the Navajo reservation, while claiming in contrast that “there is nothing 
like that here” with regard to the Menominee reservation. Menominee, 601 F.3d 
at 674. Coeur d’Alene itself distinguished Navajo Forest on the same erroneous 
basis, creating the now-32-year-old circuit split on OSHA’s application to 
Indian country. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Both cases ignored 
the elementary hornbook principle of Indian law that all tribes, regardless of 
“specific” or “explicit” treaty language—or whether they have any treaty at 
all—enjoy the inherent sovereign right to exclude nonmembers from tribal 
lands. See, e.g., Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133−34 & n. 1, 144; COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
(2012), supra note 1, § 4.01[2][e], at 220−22; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 
578−79 (citing authorities and criticizing Coeur d’Alene on this point). 
98 The court rejected any exemption from the FLSA based on the Puyallup 
Tribe’s rights under the Medicine Creek Treaty because there was no language 
in the treaty “directly on point discussing employment or wages and hours.” 
Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435. The court cited with approval United States v. 
Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 2007), which improperly asked whether 
the very same treaty protected a claimed right “expressly.” Matheson, 563 F.3d 
at 435; see also Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 580 n. 181 (discussing 
Smiskin). 
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V.      THE NEAR-MISS OF 2015–16 
 
 In the spring of 2015, three separate appeals were pending 
in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits from NLRB decisions that followed 
San Manuel in asserting federal labor relations jurisdiction over 
tribal government on-reservation gaming enterprises.99 All three 
cases were decided within the space of four weeks in the early 
summer of 2015. The two Sixth Circuit cases were especially 
interesting because that circuit had never previously taken a stand 
on the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. The Tenth Circuit case was 
especially interesting because, as discussed in Part IV, that circuit 
has been notable for its resistance to that doctrine. All three cases, 
perhaps especially the latter, seemed to offer the best (and perhaps 
last) chance for a federal appellate ruling that might reject the 
NLRB’s 2004 power grab in San Manuel,100 and force the 
Supreme Court to take up the issue. But the result was a dramatic 
and frustrating near-miss for opponents of the Coeur d’Alene 
doctrine. 
 
A. The NLRB’s (Strategic?) Reversal in the Tenth  
Circuit Chickasaw Case 
 
 First up, on June 4, 2015, was the Tenth Circuit appeal—
which was not, however, decided by the Tenth Circuit. Rather, the 
NLRB in Chickasaw Nation101 preemptively reversed its 2013 
assertion of jurisdiction in the same case,102 concluding that the 
1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek protected Chickasaw’s 
WinStar World Casino from federal labor jurisdiction.103 That 
																																																																																																																												
99 See supra note 9. 
100 See supra note 8. 
101 Chickasaw Nation, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (2015). 
102 Chickasaw Nation, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (2013). The Board was given the 
opportunity to reconsider after the Supreme Court vacated the 2013 decision, 
along with many other NLRB rulings, when it held that President Obama had 
exceeded his power under the Recess Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 
2, cl. 3, in filling vacancies on the Board. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 
2550 (2014); see also Bryan H. Wildenthal & Steven Semeraro, The Truth 
About the Supreme Court’s Recess-Appointments Ruling: A Debate, THE 
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Aug. 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538257 
[https://perma.cc/6VK4-U7BD]. 
103 Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 1–3. 
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decision effectively mooted the Nation’s appeal to the Tenth 
Circuit. 
 The 1830 treaty does contain unusually strong and specific 
language protecting the Indian Nation signatories from any outside 
laws “except such as may . . . [be] enacted by Congress, to the 
extent that Congress under the Constitution [is] required to 
exercise a legislation over Indian Affairs.”104 It was thus not 
surprising that the Board, which embraced the Coeur d’Alene 
doctrine in its 2004 San Manuel decision,105 found that Coeur 
d’Alene’s so-called “treaty exception” applied in Chickasaw.106 
 In a sense, relying so heavily on such treaty language yet 
again repeats the mistake that Coeur d’Alene and so many of its 
progeny have made, since it wrongly implies that tribes lacking 
such explicit treaty protections are less entitled to judicial 
protection of their inherent sovereignty. No tribe, not even one 
lacking any extant treaty protection at all, should be subjected to 
the intrusive application of a federal law without a showing that 
Congress intended to so intrude upon its sovereignty, and any 
ambiguities in the law should be resolved in favor of tribal 
immunity.107 
 That being said, the NLRB Chickasaw decision deserves 
praise for its analysis of treaty rights. First, the Board accurately 
set forth the general nature and scope of the classical treaty canon, 
with better care and attention to its historical origins than any court 
																																																																																																																												
104 Id. at 2, quoting Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek Between the United States 
and the Choctaw Nation, Sept. 27, 1830, art. IV, 7 Stat. 333, 334 (hereinafter 
1830 Treaty). As the Board noted, the Chickasaw Nation became in effect a 
party to this treaty in 1837. Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 1 n. 3, citing 
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 465 n. 15 (1995); 
see also Convention Between the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Jan. 17, 1837 
(approved by the United States, March 24, 1837), 11 Stat. 573, 575. The NLRB 
also noted the possible relevance of the Treaty of Washington Between the 
United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, April 28, 1866, 14 Stat. 
769 (hereinafter 1866 Treaty). See Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 1, 3–4. 
105 See supra note 8. The D.C. Circuit in San Manuel, while upholding the 
NLRB decision, claimed not to “choose between” the Coeur d’Alene doctrine 
and the classical Indian law canons. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1315. In reality, it 
took essentially the same approach as Coeur d’Alene and the NLRB. See supra 
note 87. 
106 Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 2, quoting San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 
1055, and citing Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113. 
107 See supra Part IV(especially sources supra note notes 84–86, and text 
accompanying those notes); see also infra Part V.C.2. 
 
 
124	
decision following Coeur d’Alene of which I am aware.108 This 
renders rather ironic the Board’s modest statement, opening its 
analysis, that it “has no special expertise in construing Indian 
treaties” and “therefore look[s] to the decisions of the federal 
courts to assist [it] in determining the extent of the [Chickasaw] 
Nation’s treaty rights.”109 The crucial question is to which federal 
courts the Board should defer, the circuit courts or the Supreme 
Court? In just two concise but richly informative paragraphs, the 
Board excelled (and ignored, at least there) the entire 30-year body 
of lower-court Coeur d’Alene case law.110 Thankfully, instead, the 
Board primarily relied, for its general rule statement on treaty 
interpretation, on two of the greatest Supreme Court reaffirmations 
of the classical canons.111 
 The second reason the Board’s Chickasaw decision 
deserves praise is that it remained faithful to the true meaning of 
the treaty canon in construing the language of the two treaties on 
whose meaning the decision turned. It did not require the 
Chickasaw Nation to demonstrate “explicit,” “specific,” or 
“express” treaty language supporting tribal rights.112 It construed 
the language of the 1830 treaty in a broadly pro-tribal sense, 
rejecting any implication that “Congress[’s] . . . required . . . 
legislation over Indian Affairs”113 might include a broad GFL like 
the NLRA not enacted with tribal concerns in mind.114 
 More significantly, the Board discussed the very real 
possibility that an 1866 treaty with the Chickasaw might be read to 
limit the 1830 treaty’s protections. Article VII of the 1866 treaty 
stated that the Chickasaw “agree to such legislation as Congress 
and the President . . . may deem necessary for the better 
administration of justice and the protection of the rights of person 
and property.”115 																																																																																																																												
108 See Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 2–4. 
109 Id. at 2; see also id. at 2–3 (pt. III.1, The Rules of Construction Favoring 
Indian Tribes). 
110 Id. at 2–3 (second and third paragraphs of pt. III.1).  
111 Id. at 3, quoting Winans, 198 U.S. 371, and Oneida, 470 U.S. 226. 
112 See supra Part IV (text accompanying notes 84–86); see also supra Part 
V.C.2. 
113 1830 Treaty, supra note 104, art. IV, at 334.  
114 See Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 3, quoting and discussing 1830 
Treaty, supra note 104. 
115 1866 Treaty, supra note 104, art. VII, at 771, quoted and discussed in 
Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 3. 
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 It is not difficult to imagine how most courts following 
Coeur d’Alene would probably find that kind of treaty language to 
affirmatively support applying a GFL within an Indian Nation. 
They might easily conclude that it does not “explicitly” support 
any tribal exemption from a GFL. But the NLRB in Chickasaw 
took exactly the opposite approach. In proper compliance with the 
classical canons, the Board noted that the 1866 treaty language did 
not “explicitly” support subjecting the Chickasaw Nation to 
GFLs.116 
 Furthermore, the Board noted that the potentially harmful 
1866 Article VII did not state that the Chickasaw (or the Choctaw, 
who were also signatories) “agree” to “all” federal legislation 
fitting the general description of Article VII.117 An additional 
point, which the Board did not mention but might have, is that 
Article VII “[p]rovided . . . [that] [s]uch legislation shall not in any 
wise interfere with or annul their present tribal organization, or 
their respective legislatures or judiciaries, or the rights, laws, 
privileges, or customs of the Choctaws and Chickasaw nations 
respectively.”118 Imposing the NLRA on the Chickasaw Nation 
certainly would have disrupted—as it actually has in all other 
Indian Nations wrongly subjected to the NLRA since 2004 under 
San Manuel and its progeny—the Nation’s own laws and 
regulations governing employment and labor relations within its 
own territory, including as to nonmembers of the tribe voluntarily 
choosing to work there.119 
 Finally, it should be noted, the NLRB Chickasaw decision 
is not merely an example of the Board’s claimed “discretion”—in 
cases affecting tribal sovereignty—not to exercise the sweeping 																																																																																																																												
116 Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 3 (“The language in . . . the 1866 
Treaty does not explicitly state that the Nation agrees to be subject to all federal 
laws of general applicability.”). On the contrary, the Board noted, the 1866 
language may be read as “compatible” with the protective 1830 language. Id. 
The Board, id. at 3–4, also relied on another provision of the 1866 Treaty, supra 
note 104, art. XLV, at 779–80, stating: “All the rights, privileges, and 
immunities heretofore possessed by [the Chickasaw Nation] . . . or to which [it 
was] entitled under the treaties and legislation heretofore made . . . shall be, and 
are hereby declared to be, in full force, so far as they are consistent with the 
provisions of this treaty.” 
117 Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 3; see also supra note 115.  
118 1866 Treaty, supra note 104, art. VII, at 771–72 (first emphasis in original; 
second emphasis added). 
119 See, e.g., Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 429–31, 434–37, 441–42; see 
also San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055. 
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jurisdictional power it generally claims to have. That discretionary 
restraint is an option left open by the Board’s 2004 San Manuel 
decision and exercised in another ruling that same day.120 Rather, 
Chickasaw “decline[d] to assert jurisdiction” because it conceded 
that under the applicable treaties the NLRB simply lacked power—
even under San Manuel and the Coeur d’Alene framework—to 
regulate labor relations in the Chickasaw Nation.121 
 For all these reasons, Chickasaw may be viewed as a 
significant step back by the NLRB from its aggressive project 
launched in 2004 of subjecting all Indian Nation gaming 
enterprises (and perhaps most other on-reservation businesses) to 
Board jurisdiction. Its analysis of tribal treaty rights seems sincere 
and thoughtful. If the decision was merely a cynical strategic move 
to block the case from reaching the Tenth Circuit, the Board might 
easily have ruled in the Chickasaw Nation’s favor on narrower 
grounds—perhaps by depicting the 1830 treaty rights as 
sufficiently “explicit” to overcome presumptive application of the 
NLRA. 
 At the same time, we cannot ignore the practical result, 
which was indeed to postpone to some future case any ruling on 
the San Manuel issue by the one federal circuit known to be 
skeptical of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine and generally the most 
sympathetic to tribal rights. Did the Board, perhaps, decide to 
sacrifice jurisdiction over this one Oklahoma tribal casino, in order 
to shield San Manuel from a broader challenge that might have 
generated a clear circuit split? After all, we should not forget, 
Chickasaw unapologetically reaffirmed San Manuel itself.122 																																																																																																																												
120 See San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1062; Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp., 
341 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1076–77 (2004) (exercising “discretion” not to apply the 
NLRA to a hospital controlled by several Alaska Native Nations, even though 
the Board specifically found that the hospital was “not exempt” from its 
jurisdictional power) (emphasis in original); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 
522–23 (discussing Yukon Kuskokwim and the discretion issue). 
121 Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 1; see also id. at 4 (concluding that 
“because . . . asserting jurisdiction would abrogate treaty rights specific to the 
[Chickasaw] Nation, we shall dismiss the complaint”). 
122 Id. at 1, 2, citing San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, twice with approval. 
Briana Green, San Manuel’s Second Exception: Identifying Treaty Provisions 
That Support Tribal Labor Sovereignty, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 463 
(2017), provided a thoughtful and carefully researched analysis of the 
Chickasaw decision (to which she referred using the name of the tribal 
government enterprise, WinStar World Casino). Green surveyed all ratified 
tribal treaties for language that might prove helpful in protecting Indian Nations 
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B. The Sixth Circuit: The Conflicting Little River  
    and Soaring Eagle Panels and the Petitions  
for En Banc Rehearing 
 
 The Sixth Circuit stepped into the fray just five days after 
the NLRB Chickasaw decision. On June 9, 2015, a three-judge 
panel of the Sixth Circuit decided NLRB v. Little River Band of 
Ottawa Indians, concerning application of the NLRA to the Little 
River Casino Resort, an on-reservation tribal government gaming 
enterprise south of Traverse City, Michigan.123 Only three weeks 
after that, on July 1, 2015, a different Sixth Circuit panel decided 
Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, concerning application 
of the NLRA to an on-reservation gaming enterprise operated by 
the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan.124 
 The decisions proved the old adage that timing is 
everything, because the Soaring Eagle panel unanimously favored 
rejecting both the NLRA’s application to such tribal enterprises 
and, more generally, the entire Coeur d’Alene doctrine.125 
Unfortunately, a 2-1 majority of the Soaring Eagle panel felt 
bound, under Sixth Circuit precedent rules, to follow the Little 
River panel decision released just three weeks earlier, which 
upheld application of the NLRA and heartily embraced Coeur 
d’Alene.126 
 Sharpening the drama in this unusual instance of 
near-simultaneous competing panels on the same circuit, Little 
River was not unanimous, but rather split 2-1 on the basic issue. 
The dissenting judge in Little River wrote a powerful opinion 
refuting the NLRA’s application and demolishing the premises of 
																																																																																																																												
from GFLs under Chickasaw’s approach. She found only four such treaties, 
suggesting the limits of Chickasaw’s beneficial impact. See id. at 470–81. 
123 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015); see also supra note 9. 
124 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015); see also supra note 9. 
125 Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 675; see also id. at 675–77 (White, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
126 See id. at 661–62, 675 (discussing Little River); Little River, 788 F.3d at 551, 
555–56. But see Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 675–77 (White, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Little River was distinguishable based 
on the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s treaty rights); Part V.C.2 (discussing Judge 
White’s opinion). 
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the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.127 Thus, of all six judges presiding on 
the two panels, a 4-2 majority rejected Coeur d’Alene. Yet because 
the unanimous second panel felt compelled to defer to the contrary 
view of the 2-1 majority of the first panel, it allowed the Little 
River tail to wag the Soaring Eagle. 
 The ultimate outcome in the Sixth Circuit may not have 
been different if the Soaring Eagle panel had released its opinion 
before Little River, but that at least would have forced the full en 
banc court to hear and decide both cases de novo—unless it were 
inclined to let stand the Soaring Eagle panel’s preferred approach. 
We cannot be sure whether such reconsideration would have made 
a difference. 
 As it happened, there were at the time fifteen judges in 
regular active service on the Sixth Circuit,128 and eleven of those 
judges did not participate on either the Little River or Soaring 
Eagle panels. The Little River majority opinion was written by 
Sixth Circuit Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, joined by senior Sixth 
Circuit Judge Gilbert Merritt.129 The dissenter was Sixth Circuit 
Judge David McKeague.130 The Soaring Eagle majority opinion 
was written by Judge Kathleen O’Malley, a visiting judge from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by 
designation, joined in full by Sixth Circuit Judge Bernice 
Donald.131 Sixth Circuit Judge Helene White agreed with the 
Soaring Eagle majority’s rejection of Coeur d’Alene but dissented 
in part because, as she persuasively showed, Little River was 
distinguishable based on the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s treaty 
rights.132 
 Thus, only four of the fifteen active Sixth Circuit judges 
participated on the two panels: Judges Gibbons and McKeague in 																																																																																																																												
127 Little River, 788 F.3d at 556–65 (McKeague, J., dissenting); see also Part 
V.C.4. 
128 See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Sixth_Ci
rcuit [https://perma.cc/6WLT-WJ4B]. 
129 Little River, 788 F.3d at 539. The case report does not identify Judge Merritt 
as a “senior” judge, but he did take senior status in 2001. See SIXTH CIRCUIT, 
supra note 128. 
130 Little River, 788 F.3d at 556–65 (McKeague, J., dissenting); see also infra 
Part V.C.4. 
131 Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 651 & n. *. 
132 Id. at 675–77 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
infra Part V.C.2. Compare Little River, 788 F.3d at 551 (“there [was] no treaty 
right at issue in th[at] case”). 
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Little River and Judges Donald and White in Soaring Eagle. And 
only three of those judges—McKeague, Donald, and White—
opposed Coeur d’Alene and application of the NLRA. 
 Both tribes petitioned for en banc rehearing by the full 
Sixth Circuit, but the petitions were denied in September 2015, 
with only Judge McKeague publicly dissenting.133 We may never 
know how close the actual en banc vote was among all active Sixth 
Circuit judges. Judges often choose not to publicly record dissents 
on rehearing votes. One might tend to assume Judges Donald and 
White also favored rehearing, but even if so, evidently there were 
not enough additional votes. Judge O’Malley of the Federal Circuit 
(who opposed Coeur d’Alene) was not eligible to vote on the en 
banc rehearing petition in Soaring Eagle, nor could she have 
participated on the en banc Sixth Circuit that would have decided 
the cases if rehearing had been granted. By contrast, senior Sixth 
Circuit Judge Merritt (who supported Coeur d’Alene), though 
likewise ineligible to vote on the petition for en banc rehearing in 
Little River, would have been eligible to participate with his active 
Sixth Circuit colleagues in an en banc decision.134 
 The fact that there were not enough votes to rehear the 
cases does not, of course, necessarily indicate how they would 
have been decided de novo if all the judges, presiding en banc, had 
read and heard full-dress briefs and oral arguments on the merits. 
Some judges might be disinclined to vote to rehear a panel 
decision but might well, if compelled to address the merits de novo 
on full en banc review, reach a different conclusion in the end. If 
Soaring Eagle had beaten Little River to the punch, the Sixth 																																																																																																																												
133 Little River, 788 F.3d at 537 & n. * (en banc rehearing denied Sept. 18, 2015; 
noting merely that “Judge McKeague would grant rehearing for the reasons 
stated in his [panel] dissent”); Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 648 (en banc 
rehearing denied Sept. 29, 2015; no recorded dissent). 
134 En banc rehearing may only be “ordered by a majority of the circuit judges    
. . . in regular active service.” 28 U.S.C. § 46(c); see also Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) 
(echoing this rule and limiting the vote, obviously, to active judges “who are not 
disqualified”). Rule 35(a) also notes that en banc rehearings are “not favored 
and ordinarily will not be ordered unless . . . necessary to secure or maintain 
uniformity of the court’s decisions” or when the case “involves a question of 
exceptional importance.” An en banc court in the Sixth Circuit consists of all 
active circuit judges plus any senior circuit judges who participated in a panel 
decision being reviewed. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c); Sixth Circuit Internal Operating 
Procedure 35(c), http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/rules-and-procedures (under 
“Rules,” click on “Local Rules: F.R.A.P., Local Rules, I.O.P.’s”) 
[https://perma.cc/9WM8-SFNE]. 
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Circuit would either have had to accept Soaring Eagle’s rejection 
of Coeur d’Alene or grant full en banc review. 
 
C. A Closer Look at Little River and Soaring Eagle 
 
 The 2015 Sixth Circuit opinions did not dramatically alter 
the existing analytical battle lines over the Coeur d’Alene doctrine, 
which have been clearly drawn for decades now. But there are at 
least four points worth elaborating. First, Judge Gibbons’s Little 
River opinion and Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion, 
though arriving at diametrically opposed views on Coeur d’Alene, 
shared a curious common feature. Both went to awkward lengths, 
with mixed and troublesome results, to fuse their analysis of 
whether and how GFLs should apply to Indian Nations with a 
distinct branch of Indian law—the Montana doctrine—dealing 
with the scope of inherent tribal authority over non-Indians.135 
Second, Judge White’s partial dissent in Soaring Eagle showed a 
welcome sensitivity to Indian treaty rights. Third, it is deeply 
troubling that Judge Gibbons’s Little River opinion—which now 
speaks for the Sixth Circuit—repeated two of the worst (and 
long-refuted) mistakes of San Manuel and other opinions 
influenced by the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. Fourth, but not least, 
Judge McKeague’s Little River dissent deserves special praise for 
his devastatingly vivid and concise restatement of the argument 
against what he aptly dubbed the Coeur d’Alene “house of 
cards.”136 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																												
135 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–66 (1981). 
136 Little River, 788 F.3d at 565 (McKeague, J., dissenting). A small body of law 
review commentary has already emerged on the Little River and Soaring Eagle 
decisions. See Skibine 2016, supra note 5, at 138–42 (primarily focusing on the 
Soaring Eagle panel majority’s analysis), and two student case comments also 
focusing mainly on Soaring Eagle. Cristen R. Hintze, Going “All-In” Against 
the NLRB: How Tribal Self-Government Lost on the River in the Sixth Circuit, 
55 WASHBURN L.J. 529 (2016); Riley Plumer, Overriding Tribal Sovereignty by 
Applying the National Labor Relations Act to Indian Tribes in Soaring Eagle 
Casino and Resort v. National Labor Relations Board, 35 L. INEQUALITY 131 
(2017). Skibine’s and Hintze’s analyses are especially thoughtful and 
perceptive. 
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1. Attempting to Fuse Montana and the  
    Interpretation of Federal Laws 
 
 Judge Gibbons in Little River embraced the Coeur d’Alene 
doctrine, repeating many of its familiar fallacies.137 Her two most 
egregious mistakes are discussed in Part V.C.3. Judge Gibbons 
took a somewhat innovative and interesting approach, however—
though also troubling and misguided—in extensively discussing 
the doctrine pioneered by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United 
States (1981).138 Judge O’Malley relied on the Montana doctrine 
even more extensively in her Soaring Eagle opinion, despite 
favoring a different outcome. 
 Under Montana, as expanded by several later cases, courts 
apply a rebuttable presumption that “the inherent sovereign powers 
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of 
the tribe.”139 This presumption may be overcome, however, 
pursuant to either of two important exceptions. The most relevant 
Montana exception, for present purposes, is that “Indian tribes 
retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,” notably to 
“regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities 
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe 
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements.”140 Generations of students and practitioners 
of Indian law, along with judges grappling with a wide array of 
Indian law cases, have come to know this doctrine (the 
presumption along with its two exceptions) as the “Montana rule.” 																																																																																																																												
137 See, e.g., Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 552–69, 572–85. 
138 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–66. 
139 Id. at 565. In the particular context of criminal jurisdiction, a related rule 
categorically rejects any surviving inherent power of Indian Nations to 
prosecute non-Indians. See id., citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191. Thus, Montana 
applies only to tribal civil and regulatory jurisdiction. Montana originally 
limited tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers only as to their activities on 
property within Indian country that the nonmembers owned in fee simple, but 
later cases expanded the “Montana rule” (with its two exceptions noted in the 
text and infra note 140) to tribal power over nonmembers throughout tribal 
lands. See Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 135–43 (discussing and criticizing 
Montana and its progeny); id. at 126–31 (same as to Oliphant). 
140 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). The other exception is that 
tribes retain inherent power to regulate nonmember on-reservation conduct that 
“threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 566. 
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 The Montana rule had not previously played a substantial 
role in cases grappling with how to interpret GFLs in relation to 
tribal sovereignty. Montana was not discussed or even cited in 
Coeur d’Alene itself in 1985, nor in the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 San 
Manuel decision, nor in the 1989, 1993, and 1999 cases in which 
the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted the Coeur 
d’Alene doctrine.141 Nor was it mentioned in 2002 in the leading 
(dissenting) opinion advocating the doctrine in the Tenth 
Circuit.142 
 There is a very good reason for Montana’s typical absence 
(or low profile) in most cases analyzing the application of GFLs or 
other federal laws to Indian Nations, whether under the classical 
canons of construction or the competing Coeur d’Alene doctrine.143 
The whole point of the Montana rule is that it governs the 
“inherent” powers of Indian Nations in the absence of any federal 
law or treaty relevant to the specific power at issue.144 It is a settled 
point under Supreme Court case law that Congress has the power 
to limit or abrogate inherent tribal authority over nonmembers or in 
any other respect,145 even though Montana might otherwise 
support such tribal authority. The whole point of the canons is to 
																																																																																																																												
141 See Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113; San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055; Smart 
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932–36 (7th Cir. 1989); Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment and 
Construction Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993); Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v. 
Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1127–30 (11th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part 
IV (especially notes 87–88) (discussing circuits which have followed the Coeur 
d’Alene doctrine). As discussed below in text, Montana has been discussed to a 
limited extent in some pre-2015 cases applying the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. See, 
e.g., Mashantucket, 95 F.3d 174 (1996 case in which the Second Circuit first 
adopted Coeur d’Alene) and Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (2009 Ninth Circuit case); 
see also Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 552–54 (discussing foregoing cases 
from Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits), 575 & n. 152 (briefly 
discussing Montana and noting that Coeur d’Alene did not cite it). 
142 See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1201–10 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc) (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also supra Part IV (notes 90–91 and 
accompanying text) (discussing San Juan); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 
563–69 (same, in great depth). Montana was, however, quoted and briefly 
discussed by the Tenth Circuit majority in San Juan (which did not embrace 
Coeur d’Alene). San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1193. 
143 See supra Part II. 
144 For example, a section of Montana itself, separate from the enunciation and 
application of the Montana rule, discussed whether the Crow Tribe might have 
power over nonmember hunting and fishing based on two treaties and a federal 
statute. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557–63. 
145 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196, 200–03 (2004). 
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guide courts in analyzing whether Congress has exercised that 
power intentionally or with sufficiently unambiguous clarity.146 
 Congress may also restore or expand tribal powers, 
including the understood scope of “inherent” tribal sovereignty—
including over nonmembers, even outside Indian country—even 
though Montana might not otherwise support such tribal powers.147 
The canons should also guide courts in construing the latter kind of 
federal legislation, to fulfill Congress’s pro-tribal intentions and to 
resolve any ambiguities in favor of achieving Congress’s pro-tribal 
goals.148 
 Thus, strictly speaking, the Montana rule (on the one hand) 
and the application of the canons to federal laws (on the other) are 
entirely separate and mutually exclusive approaches—apples and 
oranges. The Montana rule only comes up to bat if there is not a 
relevant federal law, and the canons can only apply to a federal law 
if there is one. 
 But Montana does have some indirect relevance to the 
problem of GFLs. Keep in mind that state laws generally do not 
apply within Indian Nations—absent some federal law properly 
construed under the canons to authorize state regulation or 
jurisdiction within Indian country.149 Thus, when it comes to civil 																																																																																																																												
146 Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113, of course, offers a competing guide. 
147 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 196, 200–05, 210; see generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, 
supra note 1, § 5.02, at 391–96. Congress has expanded tribal powers over some 
nonmembers in several important ways. See, e.g., Lara, 541 U.S. 193 
(upholding federal law restoring inherent tribal power to criminally prosecute 
Indians committing on-reservation crimes who are not members of the 
prosecuting tribe); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 
30 (1989) (applying federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)—which 
generally expands tribal powers, even off-reservation, over adoption, foster care 
placement, and termination of parental rights with regard to Indian children—to 
limit ability of non-Indians to finalize off-reservation adoption of Indian child 
born off-reservation); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 9.04, at 765–69 
(discussing Lara and tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); id., § 
11.03, at 840–45 (discussing ICWA and Holyfield). As discussed, supra notes 
139–140 and accompanying text, Montana does not support tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers nor any tribal powers outside tribal lands. 
148 The Supreme Court in Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, while not explicitly invoking 
the canons, was careful to resolve a key disputed ambiguity in ICWA—whether 
an Indian child’s “domicile” should be defined by reference to state or federal 
law—in favor of a uniform federal definition designed to achieve Congress’s 
clear intent to protect “the rights of Indian families and Indian communities.” Id. 
at 45; see also id. at 32–37, 43–45, and 49–53. 
149 See, e.g., Bryan, 426 U.S. 373; supra Part II (text accompanying notes 45–
50). There are some exceptions. For more details (not relevant for present 
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regulatory authority over things like employment, labor relations, 
health, and environmental protection within Indian country, the 
two alternatives, as a practical matter, are tribal or federal 
regulation. 
 To the extent tribes regulate their own members, it is fairly 
uncontroversial that they should continue to have power to do so, 
unless and until Congress clearly and intentionally intervenes to 
say otherwise. But what about tribal regulation of nonmembers and 
their activities within Indian lands? If by some chance, under 
Montana, tribes lack authority to regulate nonmembers in a 
particular situation, that would not prove that Congress has clearly 
and intentionally imposed federal regulation. But it would fairly 
suggest it might be a wise and desirable policy choice for Congress 
to do so. On the other hand, to the extent Montana indicates that 
tribes retain inherent power to regulate nonmembers in a given 
situation, that would suggest far less reason to assume Congress 
should intervene (or has actually done so) in that situation. 
 It is thus not surprising that when some pre-2015 cases 
following Coeur d’Alene have occasionally discussed Montana, it 
has typically been to suggest that tribes lack authority to regulate 
nonmembers, either as a general matter or with regard to the 
specific subject matter of whatever GFL was at issue. Consistently 
with Coeur d’Alene’s own erroneous and extremely misleading 
treatment of other Supreme Court precedents,150 the use of 
Montana by some cases following Coeur d’Alene has been deeply 
flawed, even deceptive. Two cases provide useful illustrations. 
 In Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel (1996),151 the 
Second Circuit applied the federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA) to a tribal government employer. Mashantucket first 
quoted Montana’s second (less relevant) exception, introducing it 
in a misleading way.152 Two pages later, in a section headed 																																																																																																																												
purposes), see, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 6.03, at 511–30, § 
7.03, at 607–11, and § 8.03[1], at 696–717. 
150 See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 572–81. 
151 Supra note 79. 
152 See supra note 140 for an accurate paraphrase and quotation of this second 
Montana exception. Mashantucket stated that tribes “may regulate any internal 
conduct which threatens the ‘political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe.’” Mashantucket, 95 F.3d at 178 (my emphasis), 
paraphrasing and quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. The vague phrase “internal 
conduct” (whose conduct?)—substituted by Mashantucket for the language 
actually used by Montana—might easily be read to suggest that tribal regulation 
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“Employment of Non-Indians,” the court quoted Montana’s 
general presumption without acknowledging it was rebuttable or 
mentioning either of the two crucial exceptions.153 This quotation 
was offered as alleged support for the court’s assertion that the 
tribe’s “employment of non-Indians weighs heavily against its 
claim” that applying OSHA would infringe on tribal 
sovereignty.154 
 Right after that second quotation (of Montana’s rebuttable 
presumption), the Mashantucket court quoted a vague general 
statement earlier in the Montana opinion (on page 564), that 
“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with 
the dependent status of the tribes . . . .”155 Montana, of course, 
went on to clarify that vague general premise on page 564 by 
concluding (on pages 565–66, where it set forth its actual rule) that 
certain tribal regulatory powers over nonmember activities within 
tribal lands are indeed “necessary to protect tribal 
self-government”156—but you would never know that from reading 
Mashantucket. 
 Thus, rather than quote Montana’s language in its actual 
proper order, working up to its final, most relevant, and specific 
guidance with respect to tribal power over nonmembers, 
Mashantucket misleadingly quoted snippets of Montana in reverse 
order, literally going backward to end up with the broadest and 
least useful language (on page 564) with respect to the issue at 
hand. And Mashantucket—apparently because it was inconvenient 
to the Second Circuit’s preferred conclusion—simply avoided any 
mention of the most specifically on-point language of Montana, 
language virtually compelling the conclusion that nonmembers 
choosing to enter on-reservation employment relationships with 
tribes become properly subject to tribal regulation. That would be 
Montana’s first exception, stating that “tribes retain inherent 																																																																																																																												
extends only to “internal relations” or conduct of tribal members, see Montana, 
450 U.S. at 564, whereas the whole point of both Montana exceptions is to 
reaffirm tribal power over certain kinds of on-reservation “activities of 
nonmembers,” id. at 565, or “conduct of non-Indians,” id. at 566. 
153 Mashantucket, 95 F.3d at 180, quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
154 Mashantucket, 95 F.3d at 181. 
155 Id. at 180, quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
156 See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
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sovereign power to . . . regulate . . . nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”157 
 The Ninth Circuit’s 2009 Matheson decision158 also 
mishandled Montana. As discussed in Part IV, Matheson applied 
the federal FLSA to an on-reservation business owned by tribal 
members (the Mathesons), which employed nonmembers. The 
Ninth Circuit did at least acknowledge the Mathesons’ argument, 
citing Montana (along with treaty language supporting a right to 
exclude nonmembers), that the tribe had “a right to regulate 
employment relationships with those nontribal members who 
consent to employment by tribal members.”159 Matheson quoted 
the same vague Montana statement (on page 564) emphasized by 
Mashantucket—that tribes generally lack power “beyond what is 
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations.”160 But Matheson did at least proceed in proper order to 
quote in full the Montana rule (with both exceptions).161 
 Matheson offered two reasons for applying the GFL at 
issue to on-reservation employees, despite the implications of 
Montana. First, the court noted that the tribe in question had not 
sought to exercise any “regulatory authority over employment and 
wages.”162 That’s a fair point and might suggest the desirability of 
some federal regulation as a policy matter. On the other hand, a 
sovereign’s decision not to regulate a particular matter at a 
particular time may itself be a legitimate exercise of regulatory 
authority. And all this would still leave unresolved the question of 
how courts should interpret federal law to determine if Congress 
has decided to exercise its regulatory power to the point of 
intruding on tribal sovereignty. The classical Indian law canons 
properly govern that question—that’s their whole raison d’être!—
but Matheson was bound by Coeur d’Alene as Ninth Circuit 
precedent. 
 Matheson’s second reason for finding the Montana rule 
irrelevant was a puzzling nonsequitur. The court asserted there was 
“no evidence that the non-Indians employed [by the Mathesons] 																																																																																																																												
157 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
158 Supra note 80.  
159 Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435. 
160 Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, quoted in Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435. 
161 Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435–36, quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. 
162 Matheson 563 F.3d at 436. 
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entered into any agreements or dealings with the . . . Tribe that 
would subject [them] to tribal civil jurisdiction.”163 That ignored 
the language of Montana that Matheson itself had just quoted, 
which upheld tribal civil jurisdiction over “nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members.”164 
 In any event, it is absurd to suggest that nonmembers who 
choose to accept employment on an Indian reservation and 
regularly commute there for that purpose, are not also consensually 
entering into a very significant “relationship” with the tribe in 
general, not just with the specific tribal employer. Tribes are 
largely defined by their membership, more so (in some respects) 
than by geographical boundaries.165 If one enters into “commercial 
dealings” with tribal members, one is by definition dealing with 
the tribe. 
 Judge Gibbons in Little River discussed Montana far more 
extensively than did Mashantucket or Matheson, or any other case 
(to my knowledge) in the Coeur d’Alene line. Judge Gibbons cited 
Montana on at least 10 distinct occasions spread over eight of the 
17 pages of her Little River opinion.166 Three of those occasions 
involved quite substantial discussions of Montana.167 
 On only one of those 10 occasions (the second) did Judge 
Gibbons quote the full actual rule (with both exceptions) set forth 
on pages 565–66 of Montana.168 Even there, she concluded by 
insisting that the Montana rule was somehow limited by the vague 
antecedent statement on page 564 of Montana (the same one 
emphasized by Mashantucket and Matheson): that tribal powers 
generally extend only to matters “necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.”169 Just to be clear 
(though at risk of repetition), let us note again that Montana itself 
clarified its statement on page 564 by concluding (with the more 
detailed Montana rule) that certain tribal regulatory powers over 																																																																																																																												
163 Id. (emphasis added). 
164 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (my emphasis), quoted in Matheson, 563 F.3d at 
436. 
165 See generally Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-
Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing 
Vision, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1993). 
166 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 544, 545, 546, 550 (three citations), 551, 552, 
553, 554.  
167 See id. at 545, 546, 551. 
168 Id. at 545, quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. 
169 Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, quoted in Little River, 788 F.3d at 545. 
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nonmember activities within tribal lands are indeed “necessary” in 
that regard. The Montana rule specifically reaffirmed and provided 
more guidance about those vital tribal powers over nonmembers.170 
 On all the other occasions (including the first) where Judge 
Gibbons cited Montana, she emphasized its general presumption 
against tribal regulation of nonmembers.171 She repeatedly cited 
and emphasized—no fewer than seven separate times throughout 
the opinion—that vague premise on page 564 of Montana.172 Judge 
Gibbons, at one point, cited a post-Montana Supreme Court case 
cautioning that the Montana exceptions should not “be construed 
in a manner that would swallow the rule or severely shrink it.”173 
That is a fair point, but Judge Gibbons seemed to go to the other 
extreme of construing Montana’s general rule (and the earlier 
statement on page 564) to the point of swallowing the exceptions 
which form a crucial part of that rule. 
 Let’s be very clear. It is not just the author of this article 
who contends that tribal powers over nonmember activities on 
tribal lands are an “important” surviving part of the inherent 
sovereignty of Indian Nations. The Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual 
(1987), decided six years after Montana, held: “Tribal authority 
over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an 
important part of tribal sovereignty.”174 You have one guess as to 																																																																																																																												
170 See supra notes 139–40, 155–56, and accompanying text. 
171 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 544, 546, 550 (three citations), 551, 552, 553, 
554. 
172 See id. at 544, 545, 546, 550 (three citations), 552. 
173 Id. at 546, quoting Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle 
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Judge Gibbons wrongly suggested that Plains Commerce “narrowed the ambit 
of Montana’s exceptions.” Little River, 788 F.3d at 546. But however debatable 
Plains Commerce’s specific 5–4 holding might be (I happen to agree with 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, Plains Commerce at 342–52), it did not claim to alter 
the Montana rule. It merely (not too surprisingly) applied that rule so as not to 
support tribal jurisdiction in a context (as Judge Gibbons noted) involving a non-
tribal bank’s sale of a parcel of reservation land that was allotted long ago and 
had passed into fee simple non-Indian ownership. See Little River, 788 F.3d at 
546; see also Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 328–29, 331, 335–37. That is a far 
cry from the scenario presented in Little River (and the many other cases which 
are the primary focus of this article), as discussed in the text below, involving 
nonmembers voluntarily entering into employment and other commercial 
relationships with tribes and their members on tribal reservation trust land.  
174 Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18; see also supra Part II (discussing Iowa Mutual 
as one of four leading Supreme Court decisions of the 1980s that applied the 
classical Indian law canons of constructions to GFLs); Wildenthal 2008, supra 
note 4, at 575 (quoting this same part of Iowa Mutual’s holding in the context of 
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the first case the Iowa Mutual Court cited to support this hornbook 
principle of American Indian law—Montana (specifically, pages 
565–66).175 
 The exact scope of Indian Nation regulatory authority over 
nonmembers under the Montana rule is, of course, a debatable 
issue that will vary with the facts of each case. But it is quite 
obvious, as noted in my 2007 article, that “one of the scenarios 
most strongly favoring [tribal power] is when nonmembers engage 
in voluntary commercial or other dealings with a tribe on its 
reservation—such as, say, employment or patronage at a tribal 
casino.”176 
 Judge Gibbons in Little River, despite her extensive 
discussion of Montana and despite acknowledging Iowa Mutual,177 																																																																																																																												
pointing out how Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113, ignored and misapplied 
Supreme Court precedents in this regard); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 460 
(quoting this same part of Iowa Mutual’s holding in the context of pointing out 
how the NLRB’s 2004 San Manuel decision, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, misapplied 
Iowa Mutual and other Supreme Court precedents in this regard); id. at 476 
(noting that the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 San Manuel decision, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 
failed to discuss or even cite Iowa Mutual, despite the fact that it was cited and 
discussed extensively in the briefs and in the NLRB opinions below); id. at 506 
(reiterating the point that Iowa Mutual and other Supreme Court precedents 
support tribal power to regulate nonmember activities on tribal lands).  
175 Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18, citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. Iowa 
Mutual also cited in support, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), and Merrion (1982), 455 U.S. 
130. Part V.C.3 of this article, infra, discusses Judge Gibbons’s blatant 
mischaracterization and misapplication of Merrion. 
176 Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 506; see generally id. at 459–61, 506–07 & 
n. 288; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 574–75; see also Little River, 788 F.3d 
at 562 (McKeague, J., dissenting) (noting that the nonmembers the Little River 
Band sought to regulate “entered into contractual (employment) relationships 
with the Band and are therefore properly subject to” tribal law), citing Montana, 
450 U.S. at 565. 
177 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 548 (citing and discussing Iowa Mutual). Judge 
Gibbons mistakenly argued that the classical Indian law canons could not 
possibly apply to all GFLs potentially affecting tribal sovereignty (as she 
seemed to concede Iowa Mutual suggested), because “the sovereign powers of 
the several states—which, unlike the sovereign powers of Indian tribes, are 
constitutionally protected,” do not receive “such solicitude.” Id. at 549. That is 
simply wrong on multiple levels. The courts, first of all, obviously do enforce 
(with great “solicitude”) the constitutional guarantees of state sovereignty. See, 
e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (enforcing constitutional rule 
protecting states against federal commandeering of state or local executive or 
legislative officials); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (enforcing 
constitutional limits on Congress’s ability to override state sovereign immunity, 
even as to a lawsuit brought by a sovereign Indian Nation); Texas v. White, 74 
U.S. 700, 725 (1869) (“The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”); see also, e.g., U.S. 
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Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (providing that “no new States shall be formed or 
erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the 
junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned”); id., art. V (providing that “no State, 
without its Consent,” not even by constitutional amendment, “shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”); amdt. XI (constitutionalizing certain 
aspects of state sovereign immunity). 
The very fact that tribal sovereignty has not been held constitutionally 
protected, but instead vulnerable to Congress’s purported “plenary” power over 
Indian Nations, see Lara, 541 U.S. at 200; Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030–32, is 
precisely the strongest argument in favor of judicial application of the canons, 
to make sure Congress exercises its powers intentionally or at least 
unambiguously. See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 554 (noting that the 
canons “were developed precisely to ameliorate and counterbalance the 
threatening potential of federal supremacy”); id. at 564–65 n. 105 (refuting an 
argument, similar to Judge Gibbons’s, in Judge Murphy’s dissent from the Tenth 
Circuit’s 2002 San Juan decision, 276 F.3d at 1205). The Supreme Court in Bay 
Mills, reaffirming the canons, confirmed that “[a]lthough Congress has plenary 
authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends 
to undermine Indian self-government.” Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2032; see also 
Little River, 788 F.3d at 563–64 (McKeague, J., dissenting) (discussing Bay 
Mills and the Little River majority’s misunderstanding of it). 
“Furthermore, even where constitutional constraints do not protect state 
sovereignty,” my 2008 article noted that “the Supreme Court has enforced a 
‘plain statement’ rule—exceeding the rigor of the comparable [congressional 
intent] Indian law canon—requiring that Congress make its intent ‘unmistakably 
clear in the language of [a] statute’ before it will be read to alter the traditional 
federal-state balance.” Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 565 n. 105, quoting 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
Judge Gibbons did not acknowledge Printz, Seminole, White, Gregory, 
or any of the constitutional provisions cited above. Instead, she merely cited two 
cases dealing with preemption of state laws by federal laws based on Congress’s 
constitutionally delegated powers. See Little River, 788 F.3d at 549. Congress’s 
exercise of its delegated powers does not threaten state sovereignty in even 
remotely the same way that its “plenary” power over Indian Nations threatens 
tribal sovereignty. Such preemption of state laws (as long as it does not threaten 
to “alter the traditional federal-state balance” so as to trigger the Gregory rule 
noted above) cannot improperly threaten state sovereignty at all (if that doctrine 
is properly understood), since it merely fulfills the constitutional design, which 
explicitly grants valid federal laws supremacy over any conflicting state laws. 
See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
It may be noted that the doctrine of “plenary” power over Indian 
Nations has a far weaker and more dubious constitutional and historical basis 
than federal supremacy over state laws. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There Is No 
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002); 
Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 142. In any event, the Supreme Court’s state 
preemption doctrine (which Judge Gibbons did not discuss in any detail) 
considers Congress’s “purpose” and “express” statutory text, and indulges a 
“presumption against preemption,” in a manner comparable to (though 
admittedly somewhat different from) the Indian law canons. See, e.g., Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565–66 & n. 3 (2009); id. at 597–98 & n. 5 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
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fundamentally failed to grasp the true import of those decisions. 
Concluding Part III—the heart of her opinion, focusing on the 
issue of tribal authority—Judge Gibbons asserted that Coeur 
d’Alene “reflects the teachings of Montana [and] Iowa Mutual” 
that “there is a stark divide between tribal power to govern the 
identity and conduct of its membership, on the one hand, and to 
regulate the activities of nonmembers, on the other.”178 
 That was an utterly bizarre assertion to make on the basis 
of two Supreme Court precedents that reaffirmed tribal power over 
nonmembers. The Montana rule, as we have seen, supports tribal 
power over nonmembers in precisely the context presented by 
Little River—where nonmembers voluntarily enter into tribal 
employment on tribal lands. Iowa Mutual applied the classical 
Indian law canons—most emphatically not anything resembling 
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine—to uphold tribal court jurisdiction 
over a civil lawsuit against a non-tribal company. Iowa Mutual did 
so against a claim that such tribal jurisdiction was divested or 
limited by the federal statute conferring diversity jurisdiction on 
the federal courts—a quintessential GFL.179 
 Judge Gibbons argued that Coeur d’Alene’s “first exception 
incorporates the teachings of Iowa Mutual.”180 But recall that 
Coeur d’Alene’s first so-called “exception” protects only “purely 
intramural” tribal self-government from Coeur d’Alene’s erroneous 
presumption that a GFL will override tribal sovereignty—even a 
GFL silent on tribal concerns, in the absence of any evidence of 
congressional intent.181 Coeur d’Alene and most of its progeny—
including Little River—have found that first exception not to 
protect tribal sovereignty precisely because (in part) nonmembers 
were involved.182 Yet Iowa Mutual upheld tribal sovereignty in 
precisely such a scenario. Judge Gibbons simply ignored, or failed 
to understand, this basic contradiction between Coeur d’Alene and 
Iowa Mutual. 																																																																																																																												
178 Little River, 788 F.3d at 551; see generally id. at 544–51 (Part III of Little 
River majority opinion). 
179 See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11–13, 17–19; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, 
at 459–61, 490–92 (discussing Iowa Mutual); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 
575, 585 (same). 
180 Little River, 788 F.3d at 551.  
181 See Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116; supra Part II (text accompanying note 
11). 
182 See, e.g., Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116–17; Little River, 788 F.3d at 552–
53, 555.  
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 Judge O’Malley’s opinion in Soaring Eagle discussed and 
relied upon Montana even more extensively than Judge Gibbons 
did in Little River.183 But Judge O’Malley drew the opposite 
conclusion from Montana. She correctly noted that the Coeur 
d’Alene doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the Montana 
rule. She pointed out, as we have already seen, that Montana’s first 
exception strongly supports tribal authority over nonmembers in 
the scenario presented by Soaring Eagle184—and, I would add, by 
virtually all similar cases involving on-reservation Indian gaming 
enterprises, or for that matter any on-reservation tribal 
employment.185 
 As noted in Part V.B of this article, Judge O’Malley 
concluded that her panel was bound by Little River as Sixth Circuit 
precedent (and thus by Coeur d’Alene)—if only by three weeks.186 
That makes Soaring Eagle’s extensive discussion of Coeur d’Alene 
and Montana merely dicta. But it merits close scrutiny since it 
drew support from three of the four judges on the two panels who 
rejected the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.187 																																																																																																																												
183 Part IV of Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion, taking up 15 of the 
opinion’s 25 pages, was devoted to discussing whether applying the NLRA to 
the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s casino would improperly intrude on the 
tribe’s inherent sovereignty. See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 661–75. The 
introductory section of Part IV summarized the Little River panel’s analysis 
(including its reliance on Montana and adoption of Coeur d’Alene). See id. at 
661–62. Parts IV.A and IV.B then set forth what the Soaring Eagle panel felt 
was the correct analysis, disagreeing with the reasoning of both Little River and 
Coeur d’Alene. See id. at 662–75. Based on extensive discussion and dozens of 
citations of Montana (more than 40, by my count, spread across 14 of the 15 
pages of Part IV), Judge O’Malley explained at length why the Soaring Eagle 
panel concluded that Montana was inconsistent with, and supported rejection of, 
Coeur d’Alene. See id. at 661–62, 664–75.  
184 See id. at 667–69 & n. 12; see also id. at 674 (summing up that “in Montana” 
as in other cases, “the Supreme Court made clear that a tribe’s right to self-
governance and its power to regulate the conduct of nonmembers extends to 
consensual commercial relationships with nonmembers”). 
185 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.  
186 See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 661–62; see also id. at 675 (Part V of Judge 
O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion). 
187 Judge Donald joined fully in Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion. Id. at 
651. Judge White dissented in part (and, in effect, from the judgment), but only 
based on her analysis of the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s treaty rights, as 
discussed in Part V.C.2 of this article. See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 656–61 
(Parts III.A and III.B of Judge O’Malley’s opinion, discussing the treaty-rights 
issue); id. at 675–77 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same, 
disagreeing with Part III.B of Judge O’Malley’s opinion). Judge White expressly 
joined all of Judge O’Malley’s opinion other than Part III.B. Id. at 675; see also 
id. at 677 (agreeing with “the majority’s conclusion that Little River is wrongly 
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 Does Judge O’Malley’s analysis offer a way forward that 
might attract support in other federal circuits, or even in the 
Supreme Court? Perhaps so. Her approach is certainly preferable to 
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. It may appear to be an appealingly 
moderate “compromise” approach in some ways. Even Supreme 
Court justices relatively sympathetic to tribal claims, on the current 
Court, have viewed Montana as a “path-marking case.”188 A 
doctrine incorporating Montana analysis, however awkwardly, 
might thus have some broad appeal on the Court. 
 But while I regret having to criticize the first and so far 
only prevailing federal court opinion to indicate a preference to 
squarely reject Coeur d’Alene,189 Judge O’Malley’s attempted 
fusion of Montana with the proper analysis of federal laws—while 
surely well-intended—was troubling and deeply problematical. 
One must hope the Supreme Court will continue, instead, to adhere 
to the classical Indian law canons it has so painstakingly developed 
and applied over the past 185 years.190 																																																																																																																												
decided but [as precedent] dictates that the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty cannot 
itself carry the day”). Judge McKeague’s Little River dissent, by contrast, did 
not reject Coeur d’Alene on the basis of Montana nor did he attempt to fuse 
Montana analysis with his application of the classical Indian law canons. He 
correctly noted that the first Montana exception supported tribal regulation of 
nonmember casino employees. See Little River, 788 F.3d at 562 (McKeague, J., 
dissenting). But he discussed Montana only briefly during the course of his 10–
page dissent and generally seemed to view it as simply irrelevant. See id. at 562–
63. That is basically correct, as I would argue. See the discussion in the text and 
infra Part V.C.4.  
188 See, e.g., Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 343 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
189 See infra Part V.C.4 (discussing the very few opinions of any kind that have 
explicitly rejected Coeur d’Alene). 
190 See supra Part II (tracing the canons back to the 1832 opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall in Worcester, 31 U.S. 515. Professor Skibine, somewhat 
similarly, noted that Soaring Eagle’s Montana-based approach was preferable to 
the approaches in Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113 or San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 
2007), 475 F.3d 1306; see Skibine 2016, supra note 5, at 130–35 (discussing 
Coeur d’Alene); id. at 135–38 (discussing San Manuel); id. at 141–42 (favorably 
comparing Soaring Eagle’s approach), yet noted (as this article does) that 
Soaring Eagle’s use of Montana was still “flaw[ed],” id. at 142. Compare 
Hintze, supra note 136, at 552–56 (also discussing, and somewhat equivocally 
criticizing and then praising, Soaring Eagle’s Montana-based approach).  
Skibine, instead of advocating a straightforward return to the classical 
canons, as this article does, proposed that GFLs affecting Indian Nations should 
be analyzed under a “practical reasoning” approach derived from the work of 
Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey. See Skibine 2016, 
supra note 5, at 127 & n. 25, citing Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation 
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Skibine 2016, supra note 
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 Judge O’Malley acknowledged the classical canons and 
recognized that they generally give tribes the benefit of the doubt, 
citing Iowa Mutual, Merrion, and two other Supreme Court cases, 
all of which applied the canons to uphold tribal sovereignty. As 
reflected in the language quoted by Judge O’Malley from all four 
cases, the proper presumption is that tribes retain sovereign 
regulatory authority unless clearly and affirmatively divested by 
federal law.191 
 The essential problem with Judge O’Malley’s hybrid 
approach was that, by awkwardly and prematurely trying to 
shoehorn Montana into the analysis of federal legislation, she 
undermined that basic pro-tribal presumption. Even the way she 
introduced her hybrid analytical framework was confusing. She 
contended that under “Supreme Court precedent,” “to determine 
whether a tribe has the inherent sovereign authority necessary to 
prevent application of a federal statute to tribal activity, we apply 
the analysis set forth in Montana.”192 Immediately after that 
puzzling statement, instead of actually citing, quoting, or 
“apply[ing]” anything in Montana, she cited and quoted Iowa 
Mutual, Merrion, and two more classical-canons Supreme Court 
cases, as just noted above. They in fact “set forth” the proper 
“analysis” to be followed. 
 Judge O’Malley’s introductory statement was puzzling 
because tribal sovereignty can never withstand or “prevent” the 
“application” of federal legislation—if Congress has clearly 
indicated its intent to override tribal power. If Congress has not 
indicated such intent, then by definition (under the canons) federal 
law does not limit tribal authority. It is literally impossible to 
analyze or resolve that issue by “apply[ing] . . . Montana.” The 
analytical focus must be on Congress’s legislation and intentions, 
not on the background scope of “inherent [tribal] sovereign 
authority.” 																																																																																																																												
5, at 155–76. Skibine’s approach has much to commend it and at times he 
reaffirmed aspects of the classical canons, e.g., id. at 162–64. My fear, however, 
would be that a “practical reasoning” approach, like Soaring Eagle’s attempted 
fusion with Montana, would make it all too easy for many judges to yield (and 
all too difficult for others to avoid yielding) to the temptations of judicial policy-
making discussed below in the text. 
191 See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 666, citing and quoting Iowa Mutual, 480 
U.S. 9, Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 
(1978), and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
192 Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 666. 
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 It is important to note that even if federal law does not 
apply in a given situation, it does not automatically follow that a 
tribe may assert its own authority. The latter is a second and 
separate analytical question, which may require further inquiry into 
the often-uncertain scope of inherent tribal sovereignty. That 
second question would certainly be subject to Montana analysis 
where nonmembers are concerned. The problem with Judge 
O’Malley’s approach was that she merged the two questions in a 
confusing way. She obscured the proper canons analysis by 
improperly putting Montana first, front, and center. She put 
Montana’s cart before the canons’ horse.193 
 This became clear as Judge O’Malley proceeded to apply 
her well-intended hybrid analysis to the NLRA. She correctly 
stated that it was necessary to “first determine whether Congress 
has demonstrated a clear intent that a [GFL] will apply to the 
activities of Indian tribes.” But she then promptly derailed herself 
by stating, confusingly, that “[i]f Congress has not so spoken, we 
would then determine if the [GFL] impinges on” certain aspects of 
tribal authority.194 If Congress has not “spoken” clearly or 
intentionally enough, however, a federal law (whether a GFL or 
specialized Indian legislation) would not and should not “impinge” 
on tribal authority at all, in the first place. The analysis of the 
federal law would be at an end, and it would simply not apply to 
the tribe. That is not to suggest the tribe would necessarily have 
authority to act as it wished in that situation. Any party with proper 
standing could certainly challenge the extent of the tribe’s own 
inherent authority, by invoking Montana. 
 Judge O’Malley, by contrast, seemed to believe that even if 
a GFL merely appears to potentially affect a tribe’s interaction 
with nonmembers, it should be presumed to apply to the tribe 
unless the tribe “demonstrate[s] that one of the two Montana 
exceptions . . . applies.”195 But that simply does not follow under 																																																																																																																												
193 A somewhat analogous analytical confusion hobbled Judge Janice Rogers 
Brown’s analysis in San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d 1306, as discussed 
in Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 504; see generally id. at 502–11. 
194 Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 667. 
195 Id. Professor Skibine hit the nail on the head with his apt observation that the 
Soaring Eagle “approach in effect creates a rebuttable presumption that 
Congress always intends a federal law to apply to Indian nations inside their 
reservations if such law has the potential to impact a significant number of non-
tribal members.” Skibine 2016, supra note 5, at 142. 
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either the classical canons or Montana, taken properly as separate 
questions considered in proper sequence. The fact that a tribe 
might possibly (hypothetically) lack authority under Montana to 
regulate certain nonmember activities does not mean a court 
should reflexively conclude—without evidence of congressional 
intent—that a given federal law (even a GFL) does apply to such 
activities. To be sure, such a hypothetical lack of tribal authority 
might arguably suggest policy reasons supporting Congress’s 
consideration of new legislation to address the problem in a 
careful, thoughtful, and intentional manner. 
 Judge O’Malley, despite quoting relevant language from 
Merrion, did not seem to understand the significance of that 
landmark precedent in the Supreme Court’s Indian jurisprudence. 
She stated that because Soaring Eagle involved an employee who 
was “a nonmember of the Tribe,” “the aspects of inherent [tribal] 
sovereignty recognized in . . .  Merrion are not applicable. 
Accordingly, unless one of the Montana exceptions [applies] . . .  
the NLRA should apply to the [Tribe] . . . .”196 That makes no 
sense. The central issue in Merrion was tribal power—which the 
Supreme Court upheld—to tax nonmembers engaged in on-
reservation business.197 Merrion, like Soaring Eagle, but unlike 
Montana, involved the proper interpretation under the canons of 
federal legislation claimed as limiting tribal authority,198 and thus 
had far more direct and obvious “application” to Soaring Eagle 
than did Montana. 
 There is, one must concede, a certain commonsense appeal 
to the notion that in the absence of clear congressional guidance, 
courts should resort to the Montana framework. But embracing 
such an approach would be fundamentally inconsistent with the 
canons—and even more importantly, inconsistent with any proper 
judicial role. It would tempt and encourage courts to undermine 
tribal sovereignty by improperly engaging in their own policy 
analysis—in judicial legislation, to put it bluntly—untethered by 
the democratic political constraints that properly apply to 
Congress. While Judge O’Malley and her Soaring Eagle 
colleagues commendably resisted that temptation, this is exactly 
the kind of free-form administrative and judicial policy-making 																																																																																																																												
196 Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 667. 
197 See generally Merrion, 455 U.S. 130. 
198 See id. at 149–52; see generally supra Part II. 
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approach that led to the improper expansion of the NLRA in the 
first place, in the San Manuel cases199—and eventually in Little 
River. 
 As we have seen, the hypothetical stated above, about 
possible lack of tribal power under Montana, is very unlikely with 
regard to the typical scenario discussed in this article—a tribe’s 
regulation of nonmembers choosing to engage in on-reservation 
employment. Montana’s first exception plainly and amply supports 
tribal authority in that scenario. As we have also seen, Judge 
O’Malley herself correctly reached that ultimate conclusion. She 
would have held accordingly in Soaring Eagle were it not for the 
Sixth Circuit precedent rule that she felt commanded obedience to 
Little River’s erroneous contrary holding. 
 
2. Judge White in Soaring Eagle: A Welcome Attempt  
     to Revive and Contextualize Treaty Rights  
 Within the Broader Framework  
 of Indian Sovereignty 
 
 The two Sixth Circuit judges who appeared in 2015 to have 
the soundest understanding of the Supreme Court’s case law on 
tribal sovereignty were Judge Helene White in Soaring Eagle and 
Judge David McKeague in Little River. (Judge McKeague’s Little 
River dissent is discussed in Part V.C.4.) 
 Judge White agreed with the Soaring Eagle panel majority 
“that Little River was wrongly decided, that Coeur d’Alene . . . is 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent,” and that the NLRA 
did not properly apply to the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe on that 
basis alone.200 She also agreed with “the majority’s conclusion that 																																																																																																																												
199 See supra note 8; see also, e.g., Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 504.   
200 Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 675 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Judge White, while joining the relevant parts of Judge O’Malley’s 
opinion, did not comment specifically on Judge O’Malley’s troubling and 
needlessly laborious attempt to fuse Montana analysis with the classical canons 
of construction, as discussed in Part V.C.1. One has to wonder, given Judge 
White’s strong understanding of tribal sovereignty reflected in her dissent, 
whether she actually embraced Judge O’Malley’s approach wholeheartedly. 
Perhaps she went along merely because Judges O’Malley and Donald were not 
willing to go any further in repudiating Coeur d’Alene, or because (as explained 
in her dissent) the outcome in Soaring Eagle did not ultimately turn on inherent 
tribal sovereignty in any event, or both. 
Judge White’s dissent of barely more than two pages seemed to cover 
more ground, more lucidly and effectively, than Judge O’Malley’s lumbering 
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Little River [as circuit precedent by three weeks] . . . dictates that 
the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty cannot itself carry the day.”201 But 
she ultimately dissented because she found that the Saginaw 
Chippewa Tribe’s rights under the U.S.-Chippewa Treaty of 
1864202 protected its authority to regulate the employment of 
nonmembers on its reservation and have never been abrogated by 
the NLRA or any other federal law.203 
 Judge O’Malley’s majority opinion in Soaring Eagle 
agreed that the tribe’s treaty rights have not been abrogated204 and 
offered a decent recital of the treaty canon of construction.205 
Sadly, however, even though Judge O’Malley generally rejected 
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine (as discussed in Part V.C.1), she 
yielded to that doctrine’s perversion of the treaty canon to require a 
showing of “specific” treaty rights (as discussed in Part IV). Her 																																																																																																																												
25-page panel opinion. Judge White’s dissent focused mainly on the treaty-
rights issue, as discussed in this subpart. But her most significant general 
comment on Coeur d’Alene seems more succinctly in line with Judge 
McKeague’s Little River dissent than with the Soaring Eagle panel majority: 
 
That Little River and Coeur d’Alene relegate tribal sovereign 
rights of exclusion to history does not justify the abrogation of treaty-
based exclusionary rights as well. . . . Indeed, the very purpose of the 
Treaty was to operate as a bulwark against any erosion of the Tribe’s 
sovereign rights that might otherwise occur. In Little River and Coeur 
d’Alene, the tribes’ inherent sovereignty was curtailed notwithstanding 
the absence of express congressional intent to do so. Where those 
courts derived the right or authority to make such a finding is not 
apparent in the reasoning of the opinions themselves, nor is it apparent 
from Supreme Court precedent. 
 
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 677 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
201 Id. 
202 14 Stat. 657; see also Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 651. 
203 See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 675–76 & n. 1 (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). The exact scope of Judge White’s dissent is a bit of a 
puzzle. She specifically stated that she joined “all but section III(B) of [Judge 
O’Malley’s] majority opinion.” Id. at 675; see also id. at 657–61 (Part III.B of 
the majority opinion, containing the treaty analysis with which Judge White 
disagreed). Logically, given the reasoning of her dissent, Judge White should 
also have dissented, a fortiori, from the panel judgment set forth in Part V of the 
majority opinion. See id. at 675. Yet her statement just quoted seemed to 
indicate, oddly, that she joined Part V and thus the judgment. She reiterated in 
conclusion only that she “respectfully dissent[ed] from section III(B) of the 
majority opinion.” Id. at 677 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
204 Id. at 657–59. 
205 See id. at 656–57. 
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panel majority opinion held that the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s 
“general [treaty] right of exclusion [of tribal nonmembers]” was 
insufficiently “specific” to preclude the enforcement within Indian 
country of a GFL like the NLRA.206 
 The panel majority acknowledged, but failed to really 
grasp, the elementary hornbook principle of Indian law that every 
tribe enjoys the sovereign authority to exclude nonmembers from 
the reservation, and that—as the Supreme Court held in Merrion—
this “necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on 
entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct.”207 
Furthermore, this basic element of inherent tribal sovereignty not 
only most emphatically does not depend on any “specific” or 
“explicit” treaty right, it does not depend on support in any treaty 
whatsoever.208 
 The panel majority twice cited the Supreme Court’s treaty-
rights decision in Dion (1986),209 but only for the point that 
Congress has the power to abrogate such rights—a power 
concededly not exercised in Soaring Eagle, making the citations 
somewhat off-point. The majority ignored the fact that Dion—
consistently with the generous interpretation of treaty rights 
required by the treaty canon—flatly repudiated the notion that such 
rights must be “specific” or “explicit.” Dion declared that treaty 
hunting and fishing rights within tribal lands “need not be 
expressly mentioned in the treaty.”210 																																																																																																																												
206 Id. at 661 (emphasis added); see also id. at 659–61 (repeatedly contrasting 
“broad,” “non-specific,” or “general” treaty rights with “specific” or “explicit” 
treaty rights, and indicating that only the latter would suffice). But see 
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 577–81. 
207 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144. Ironically, the panel majority quoted this very 
passage in Merrion, Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 659, but failed to grasp that 
Merrion illustrates the very point noted in the text following this note, that this 
basic tribal right does not depend on treaty rights at all (whether “general” or 
“specific”). Merrion itself involved a tribe lacking any treaty protection at all. 
As the Merrion Court itself explicitly held: “The fact that the Jicarilla Apache 
reservation was established by Executive Order rather than by treaty or statute 
does not affect our analysis; the Tribe’s sovereign power is not affected by the 
manner in which its reservation was created.” Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134 n. 1 
(emphases added); see also supra note 97; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 
578–79. 
208 See supra notes 97 and 207; Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133–34 & n. 1, 144; 
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 578–79.  
209 Supra note 25; see also Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 657, 659. 
210 Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added); see also Wildenthal 2008, supra 
note 4, at 581; Hintze, supra note 136, at 556 (aptly noting that the Soaring 
Eagle majority’s “fatal flaw was the misapplication of [the] Indian law canons 
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 Judge White, by contrast, clearly understood and applied all 
these principles. Conceding sardonically that the 1864 treaty did 
not “expressly state” that “federally recognized labor unions 
cannot solicit on tribal land,” she bluntly stated the relevant point: 
“[I]t does not need to.”211 Quite the contrary. As Judge White 
noted, the treaty must be interpreted as the Indian signatories 
reasonably and originally would have understood it. “To parse the 
specificity of the over 150-year-old Treaty to the Tribe’s detriment 
violates recognized canons of interpretation.”212 She correctly 
articulated the tribal right to exclude, and that it did not depend on 
specific treaty support or indeed any treaty support at all.213 
 As the latter point illustrates, Judge White was admirably 
careful to keep treaty rights in proper context within the broader 
framework of tribal sovereignty. As explained in Part IV, 
overemphasizing treaty rights (important though they are) may 
promote a tendency (even if unconscious) to undermine the 
sovereign rights of the many tribes that lack treaties. That is a 
pitfall that has frequently been overlooked (or exploited) by cases 
following the Coeur d’Alene doctrine and its so-called “treaty 
exception.” Indeed, Coeur d’Alene has operated as a viciously 
effective two-pronged pincer attack in this regard: on the one hand, 
isolating and undermining the sovereignty of tribes without 
treaties, and on the other hand, undermining the generous 
interpretation of treaties themselves. 
 Judge White concluded her dissent with an elegantly 
balanced summation. “[T]he Treaty matters, and to find otherwise 
suggests that the federal government’s agreement with the Tribe is 
not worth the paper on which it was written.”214 On the other hand, 
she noted: “It may well be that when a tribe’s inherent sovereignty 
rights are broadly interpreted, its treaty-based . . .  right[s] . . . 
ha[ve] little work to do. But out of necessity, the treaty-based right 																																																																																																																												
on the treaty language at issue”); id. at 556–58, 561–62 (criticizing the 
majority’s treaty analysis). 
211 Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 676 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  
212 Id. 
213 See id. at 676–77 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She 
noted, for example, that “Merrion did not involve a treaty.” Id. at 677; see also 
supra note 207. 
214 Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 677 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 
 
151	
assumes a paramount role when a tribe’s inherent sovereignty has 
been judicially narrowed . . . .”215 
 As noted in Part V.C.1, Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle 
opinion was the first, and so far remains the only majority opinion 
by any federal court to take a clear stand against Coeur d’Alene’s 
erosion of tribal sovereignty—albeit fruitlessly since it bowed to 
Little River as circuit precedent.216 It is thus all the more 
disappointing that the panel majority effectively threw in the towel 
when it came to the fallback tribal treaty defense. Judge White 
valiantly attempted a last stand behind the treaty barricade. 
 
3. Do They Never Learn? The Outrageous Repetition  
      of Errors by Judge Gibbons in Little River 
 
 In my 2007 article, I undertook the unpleasant task of 
noting the embarrassing claim by Judge Janice Rogers Brown, 
author of the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 San Manuel opinion, that she and 
two D.C. Circuit colleagues could not find any of the Supreme 
Court cases applying the classical Indian law canons to GFLs—
even though four were cited on point in the briefs filed in that very 
case, three of which were also cited on point in the published 
NLRB opinions under review.217 In Part III of this article, I had the 
even more distressing task of noting that Judge Brown’s D.C. 
Circuit colleague, Judge David Tatel, outrageously repeated this 
claim in the 2011 El Paso Natural Gas opinion.218 
 This is not a matter of opinion or interpretation. It is a 
factual reality that the Supreme Court has applied the ambiguity 
and congressional intent canons to multiple GFLs, in multiple 
cases. One might disapprove of these decisions, or disagree with 
them, or seek to distinguish them, but they did happen. 
Furthermore, for the D.C. Circuit judges to deny they were put on 
notice of this reality was doubly false, leaving only two possible 																																																																																																																												
215 Id. 
216 See supra Part V.B (Little River as circuit precedent); see also supra Part 
V.C.1 (text accompanying note 189), and infra Part V.C.4 (discussing the very 
few opinions of any kind that have explicitly rejected Coeur d’Alene). 
217 See San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312; supra Part III (notes 32–
33 and accompanying text); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 475–80. 
218 See El Paso Natural Gas (D.C. Cir. 2011), 632 F.3d at 1278, quoting San 
Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312; supra Part III (notes 34–52 and 
accompanying text). 
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and equally unpalatable explanations—intentional dishonesty or 
embarrassing incompetence. 
 This is also not a partisan problem. Judge Brown, viewed 
as a conservative, was appointed by President George W. Bush 
over strong Democratic opposition.219 Judge Tatel, viewed as a 
liberal, was appointed by President Bill Clinton to fill the seat 
vacated by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg upon her promotion to the 
Supreme Court. A total of five D.C. Circuit judges have now 
subscribed to this head-in-the-sand double-denial of reality. Judge 
Brown in 2007 was joined by Judge Merrick Garland, appointed 
by President Clinton and famously (unsuccessfully) nominated for 
promotion to the Supreme Court by President Barack Obama in 
2016. Judge Tatel in 2011 was joined by Judge Judith Rogers, also 
appointed by President Clinton. Judge Stephen Williams, 
appointed by President Ronald Reagan, joined both San Manuel in 
2007 and El Paso Natural Gas in 2011.220 
 I now have the still more distressing task of reporting that 
Judge Julia Smith Gibbons in Little River, joined by Judge Gilbert 
Merritt (bringing us to a total of seven life-tenured federal judges), 
repeated this factually false claim yet again in 2015.221 This is 
deeply discouraging for a legal scholar whose life work has 
consisted mainly of studying the work-product of judges. Has our 
present maddening and nihilistic era of “fake news” and 
“alternative facts” also become one of “fake law” or “alternative” 
Supreme Court jurisprudence? Leaving aside legitimately 
divergent opinions about the various legal doctrines enunciated 
and applied by the Supreme Court, are we unable even to agree 
about what doctrines the Court has in fact enunciated and applied 
and in what factual context? 
 Even worse, it is impossible to ignore clear indications of 
conscious deception and self-contradiction in the crafting of Judge 																																																																																																																												
219 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 429 & n. 42. 
220 See San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1307; El Paso Natural Gas, 632 F.3d at 1273; 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_District_
of_Columbia_ 
Circuit [https://perma.cc/6UVX-6GC2]. 
221 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 539 (identifying judges on panel); id. at 551, 
citing San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312. The bipartisan nature of the problem 
continues. Judge Gibbons was appointed by President George W. Bush. Senior 
Judge Merritt was appointed by President Jimmy Carter. See SIXTH CIRCUIT, 
supra note 128. 
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Gibbons’s opinion. Judge Gibbons herself discussed two of the 
four Supreme Court cases applying the canons to GFLs—Merrion 
and Iowa Mutual—that were (we may charitably assume) 
overlooked by Judges Brown and Tatel in 2007 and 2011.222 
 Judge Gibbons acknowledged the ambiguity canon and that 
(like all the canons) it “is rooted in the unique trust relationship 
between the United States and the Indians.”223 But, she insisted, “it 
does not undermine that trust relationship to presumptively apply a 
[GFL] to a tribe’s regulation of . . . non-members where the tribal 
regulation is not necessary to the preservation of tribal self-
government.”224 That comment was part of Judge Gibbons’s 
selective misuse of the statement on page 564 of Montana—mostly 
ignoring, as in this very instance, the actual Montana rule stated on 
pages 565–66 of that case—and defying the teachings of Merrion, 
Iowa Mutual, and Montana (among many other cases) that tribal 
regulation of nonmembers is often “necessary to the preservation 
of tribal self-government” and amply supported by the Montana 
rule.225 
 Judge Gibbons’s false statement in 2015 tracked very 
closely the doubly false nature of Judge Brown’s 2007 statement. 
Judge Gibbons, like Judge Brown, first falsely claimed that the 
cases cited by the Indian Nation at bar, to support the application 
of the ambiguity canon, involved only specialized Indian 
legislation.226 There is something especially insufferable about 																																																																																																																												
222 For citations and discussions of Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, see Little River, 788 
F.3d at 544 (two citations, though only of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Merrion); 
id. at 547 n. 1 (a lengthy footnote devoted entirely to discussing how Merrion 
bears on the issue of interpreting GFLs, quoting the very pages in which 
Merrion applied both the congressional intent and ambiguity canons to a GFL—
see below in this subpart for an explanation of the utterly misleading and 
intellectually dishonest nature of that discussion by Judge Gibbons). 
For citations and discussions of Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9, see Little 
River, 788 F.3d at 548 (half a paragraph devoted to discussing the very fact that 
Iowa Mutual applied the congressional intent canon to a GFL); id. at 550 (again 
citing Iowa Mutual’s application of the canons to a GFL); id. at 551 (twice 
citing Iowa Mutual, in service of what was, at best, a confused and deeply 
mistaken argument that Coeur d’Alene somehow “reflects the teachings of . . . 
Iowa Mutual”); see also supra Part V.C.1 (notes 174–82 and accompanying 
text) (discussing these citations and discussions of Iowa Mutual by Judge 
Gibbons). 
223 Little River, 788 F.3d at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
224 Id., citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. 
225 See supra Part V.C.1 (discussing Judge Gibbons’s misuse of Montana, 
Merrion, and Iowa Mutual). 
226 Little River, 788 F.3d at 550–51. 
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such efforts to blame the briefing, by the very tribe whose 
sovereignty was erroneously and unjustly curtailed, for the court’s 
own incompetent (or deceptive) mishandling of governing 
Supreme Court precedents. That is especially true when (as we will 
shortly see) the briefing in each case actually goes far to expose 
each court’s incompetence (or dishonesty). 
 Judge Gibbons then cited and closely paraphrased Judge 
Brown’s 2007 statement, stating: “Like the D.C. Circuit, we have 
found no case in which the Supreme Court applied this canon to 
resolve an ambiguity in a statute of general application silent as to 
Indians, like the NLRA.”227 The only material change in Judge 
Gibbons’s paraphrase, from Judge Brown’s 2007 statement, was 
that Judge Gibbons added the last seven words: “silent as to 
Indians, like the NLRA.” 
 Unfortunately, that weak and ham-handed attempt to 
qualify Judge Brown’s statement is the most important red flag that 
this part of Judge Gibbons’s opinion was consciously and 
deceptively crafted to evade the binding precedential force of the 
Supreme Court’s case law on this point—in particular, Merrion. 
Another red flag, mentioned above, is that Little River elsewhere 
cited and discussed Merrion (and Iowa Mutual), proving that the 
opinion’s author was perfectly well aware of those Supreme Court 
precedents. Unlike with Judge Brown’s and Judge Tatel’s 2007 
and 2011 versions of this false statement, Judge Gibbons herself 
removed any possible defense of mere mistake, ignorance, or 
incompetence. 
 In fact, the Little River Band’s principal brief in Little 
River repeatedly cited Merrion and Iowa Mutual and argued that 
both those Supreme Court GFL cases supported the application of 
the canons.228 So did all four briefs filed by amici.229 One brief 																																																																																																																												
227 Id. at 551, citing San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312.  
228 See Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians (filed July 8, 2013, in Little River, 788 F.3d 537) at iv (citing Merrion, 
455 U.S. 130, “passim” throughout, and Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9, on six 
different pages); see also supra note 32 (citing references documenting the 
briefing in San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, belying the D.C. Circuit’s false 
claim in 2007).  
229 See Brief of Amici Curiae Chickasaw Nation et al. at iv, 3, 7, 22–23, 28–29; 
Brief of Amici Curiae Navajo Nation et al. at ii, 9, 16, 18; Brief of Amici Curiae 
National Congress of American Indians and White Mountain Apache Tribe at 
iii–iv, 4, 6, 14–15, 24 n. 8; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Indian Law 
Scholars at 3–4, 11–13, 16, 22–24, 28 (all filed July 15, 2013, in Little River, 
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specifically cited and debunked the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 statement 
and expressly cautioned the Sixth Circuit against following it, 
noting that the D.C. Circuit “overlooked” two key Supreme Court 
cases applying the canons to GFLs.230 The Little River Band’s 
reply brief carefully discussed the congressional intent and 
ambiguity canons.231 The tribe noted that the NLRB misunderstood 
those canons and that the NLRB erroneously contended “that the 
principle applies only to Indian-specific statutes,” which, the tribe 
noted, “finds no basis in the law.”232 In short, it was simply 
outrageous for Judge Gibbons to suggest inadequate briefing 
somehow supported or contributed to her decision to blow past 
such warnings and repeat the D.C. Circuit’s error. 
 Let us look more closely now at Judge Gibbons’s attempt 
to qualify and somehow salvage the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 false 
statement. First, it must be conceded that—read literally—Judges 
Brown, Tatel, and Gibbons all qualified the scope of their 
statements by limiting them to the ambiguity canon. They did not 																																																																																																																												
788 F.3d 537). (I was not involved in any of the briefs in these cases.) The latter 
brief, on the pages cited, repeatedly cited Dion, 476 U.S. 734, as well as 
Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, and Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9, all with regard to their 
application of the canons to GFLs.  
230 Brief of American Indian Law Scholars, supra note 229, at 28, quoting San 
Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312 (noting D.C. Circuit’s failure to 
acknowledge Dion and Iowa Mutual); see also supra note 229; Brief of 
American Indian Law Scholars, supra note 229, at 11–12 (also citing Merrion’s 
application of the canons to a GFL). All three Supreme Court cases were in fact 
cited in briefs filed in San Manuel, just as they were again cited in the briefs 
filed in Little River. See supra Part II (note 32 and accompanying text). All to no 
avail, apparently. 
231 See Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians (filed Aug. 29, 2013, in Little River, 788 F.3d at 6–7) (the tribe referred 
to the congressional intent canon as “the clear-expression principle”). 
232 Id. at 7, citing Dion, 476 U.S. 734, and Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9 (specifically 
noting that Dion and Iowa Mutual both involved GFLs). The tribe did not cite 
Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, in this particular passage, but did so elsewhere in this 
brief (and, see supra note 228, in its principal brief). Minutely parsing the reply 
brief, it may be noted that the tribe did not state with perfect clarity that both 
canons apply to GFLs. In referring to “the principle,” the tribe appeared to refer 
to “the clear-expression principle” (its term for the congressional intent canon). 
In this passage, it appeared to refer to the ambiguity canon as “the Indian 
canon.” However, it argued that the NLRB improperly conflated the two canons 
and described the NLRB as erroneously limiting “the principle” (perhaps both 
canons combined?) to specialized Indian legislation. But that is all beside the 
point, which is that the Sixth Circuit was more than sufficiently briefed about 
Merrion, about the other relevant Supreme Court GFL canons cases, and what 
they all stood for. It is obviously the duty of a lower federal court to familiarize 
itself with governing Supreme Court precedents and to follow them. 
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specifically deny that the congressional intent canon might apply 
to a GFL.233 There is no logical reason, however, why the two 
canons would apply differently—why one would apply to GFLs 
while the other would be categorically inapplicable.234 None of 
these judges suggested any reason for such a bizarre and 
counterintuitive notion. Nor has the Supreme Court. Quite the 
contrary. The Supreme Court in Merrion made perfectly clear that 
both canons apply to GFLs.235 
 The logical implication of the statements by Judges Brown, 
Tatel, and Gibbons, in all three cases, was that none of the classical 
canons should apply to GFLs. Judge Gibbons argued that “it does 
not undermine [the federal-tribal] trust relationship to 																																																																																																																												
233 See San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312; El Paso Natural Gas, 
632 F.3d at 1278; Little River, 788 F.3d at 551. 
234 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 479. There have, of course, been 
legitimate debates about whether both canons, or the canons generally, do or 
should apply to GFLs affecting tribal rights to the same general extent they do to 
specialized Indian legislation, though I have argued that they do and should. See, 
e.g., supra Part II (especially note 37); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 493; 
see generally id. at 484–502. Some federal laws do not implicate the canons at 
all. See supra note 36. And a court in any given case might easily happen to 
apply one canon but not the other. The Supreme Court, for example, has applied 
the congressional intent canon to GFLs in several cases without bothering to 
also discuss or apply the ambiguity canon, either because there was no relevant 
ambiguity, or because the congressional intent canon sufficed to decide the case, 
or both. See, e.g., Escondido, 466 U.S. 765, Dion, 476 U.S. 734, and Iowa 
Mutual, 480 U.S. 9. None of those cases even hinted that the ambiguity canon 
was somehow categorically inapplicable. 
But that is all beside the point. The issues under discussion are whether 
the Supreme Court has in fact (rightly or wrongly) applied both canons to GFLs 
(it has; see supra note 235), whether it has ever suggested that one but not the 
other canon might be categorically inapplicable to GFLs (it has not), and 
whether there would be any imaginable reason whatsoever to treat a GFL (or 
any federal law) as categorically subject to one but not the other canon. There is 
not, as noted and explained in the text above, infra note 235, supra Part II, and 
in the cited pages of my 2007 article. 
235 See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 149–52. Indeed, Merrion applied both canons to 
several GFLs (naming one in particular) as well as to at least two specialized 
laws dealing with Indians. See id. at 149 (referring to “two federal Acts 
governing Indians and various pieces of federal energy legislation”) (emphasis 
added); id. at 150–51 (discussing 1927 and 1938 acts of Congress dealing 
specifically with mineral resources on Indian lands); id. at 151 (referring 
generally to “national energy policies” and related “federal law”); id. at 151–52 
(specifically discussing the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, an obvious GFL). 
Merrion carefully applied the congressional intent canon to all of this federal 
legislation, id. at 149–52, and explicitly applied the ambiguity canon to all of it 
as well, id. at 152, all in service of its holding that none of it limited tribal power 
to tax nonmembers exploiting mineral resources on tribal lands, see id. at 133–
37, 152, 159. See also Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 477–78 & n. 204. 
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presumptively apply a [GFL]” to a tribe in situations like that 
presented in Little River.236 “Presumptive application” would 
necessarily, of course, dispense with any need to identify evidence 
of congressional intent, as well as not being deterred by any 
ambiguity or silence in the relevant federal law. 
 One is forced to speculate that the statements by Judges 
Brown, Tatel, and Gibbons may have been limited to the ambiguity 
canon, in order to avoid contradicting too obviously the larger 
number of Supreme Court precedents (beyond Merrion) that have 
emphatically applied the congressional intent canon to various 
GFLs. Those cases include, just from the 1980s, Escondido, Dion, 
and Iowa Mutual.237 This particular qualification did not, of course, 
salvage the accuracy of these statements, given the inconvenient 
existence of Merrion, which applied the ambiguity canon as well 
as the congressional intent canon to GFLs.238 
 Judge Gibbons added the further qualification that she was 
unaware of any Supreme Court case applying the ambiguity canon 
to a GFL “silent as to Indians.”239 She did not offer any reason why 
a GFL’s complete silence about Indian or tribal concerns, as 
opposed to making some mention of such concerns, should make 
any difference with regard to the applicability of the ambiguity 
canon—or the congressional intent canon for that matter. It appears 
that her qualification was purely and intentionally designed to 
sidestep Merrion as a precedent on point—and as an obvious 
obstacle to the conclusion she was determined to reach. The GFL 
most prominently analyzed in Merrion under the ambiguity canon 
was admittedly not completely silent about tribal concerns.240 																																																																																																																												
236 Little River, 788 F.3d at 550. 
237 See supra Part II, discussing, e.g., Escondido (1984), 466 U.S. 765, Dion 
(1986), 476 U.S. 734, and Iowa Mutual (1987), 480 U.S. 9; see also supra note 
234. 
238 See Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, discussed in note 235. 
239 Little River, 788 F.3d at 551. 
240 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 477. The fact that a GFL may happen 
to include some minor or incidental mention of Indians or tribal concerns does 
not mean it ceases to be a GFL. That does not somehow convert such a GFL into 
specialized Indian legislation. The GFL most prominently analyzed in Merrion 
was the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA). See supra note 235. I daresay no one 
would call that specialized Indian legislation, though it did happen to include a 
provision defining recoverable costs to include tribal taxes. Some GFLs, like the 
NLRA central to this article, or the diversity jurisdiction statute at issue in Iowa 
Mutual (see text accompanying note 241), may be completely silent on tribal 
concerns. Others, like the NGPA at issue in Merrion, or the Eagle Protection Act 
 
 
 
158	
 By contrast, Judge Gibbons conceded that the 
congressional intent canon did apply even to GFLs “silent as to 
Indians.” She recognized that Iowa Mutual “refused to read the 
statute granting federal diversity jurisdiction, which is silent as to 
Indian tribes,” to limit certain tribal court remedies, because of 
“the absence of clear congressional intent” supporting any such 
limitation.241 Iowa Mutual involved tribal power over 
nonmembers, which Judge Gibbons ignored. Her studious 
disregard of that point apparently explains how she could reconcile 
her concession just quoted with her contradictory suggestion two 
pages later that the canons should not apply at all to a GFL 
affecting a tribe’s regulation of nonmembers—because, in her 
mistaken view (quoted twice above), that “does not undermine [the 
federal-tribal] trust relationship.”242 
 Leaving aside its apparent improper purpose—to sidestep 
Merrion—Judge Gibbons’s qualification about a GFL’s “silence” 
as to Indians did not succeed in salvaging, in any meaningful way, 
the accuracy of her version of the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 statement. 
On the contrary, as noted earlier, it constitutes a red flag 
highlighting the dishonest nature of Judge Gibbons’s version of 
that statement. 
 While the key GFL analyzed in Merrion did contain an 
incidental tribal-related provision, it was not that part of the law 
that was alleged to limit tribal authority. Rather, it was the 
overwhelming remainder of that law, silent on tribal concerns, 																																																																																																																												
(EPA) at issue in Dion, may include one or more incidental tribal-related 
provisions. 
A tribal-related provision in a GFL (as in any federal law), depending 
on its content and context, might be favorable, neutral, or unfavorable to any 
given tribal-sovereignty claim. Merrion (applying both the congressional intent 
and ambiguity canons) happened to view the tribal-tax provision in the NGPA as 
one factor supporting its holding that the NGPA did not curtail tribal rights. See 
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 151–52; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 477. Dion 
(applying the congressional intent canon while not discussing the ambiguity 
canon; see supra note 234) happened to view the Indian religious permit 
exemption in the EPA as a crucial factor supporting its holding that Congress 
did in fact otherwise intend to curtail tribal rights in that case. See Dion, 476 
U.S. at 738–45; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 440–41. 
241 Little River, 788 F.3d at 548, citing Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18 (statutory 
citation omitted). 
242 Little River, 788 F.3d at 550; see also supra notes 224 and 236 and 
accompanying text. Judge Gibbons’s confused and mistaken treatment of Iowa 
Mutual has already been discussed, supra Part V.C.1 (notes 174–82 and 
accompanying text).   
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which allegedly curtailed tribal sovereignty. And that was 
precisely the most important part of the law—the tribally silent 
part—that the Supreme Court subjected to both relevant Indian 
law canons. So the Supreme Court has, in fact, “applied th[e] 
[ambiguity] canon to . . . a [GFL] silent [in relevant part] as to 
Indians, like the NLRA.”243 
 The Merrion Court noted the highly generalized nature of 
the attack on tribal authority in that case, commenting that while 
the litigants “argu[ed] that Congress,” in the various GFLs and 
specialized Indian legislation discussed, implicitly “deprived the 
Tribe of its authority to impose [a] severance tax,”244 they “cite[d] 
no specific federal statute restricting Indian sovereignty.”245 The 
Merrion Court carefully noted three separate reasons for finding 
the key GFL not to curtail tribal authority. The Court, (1) applying 
the congressional intent canon, found no evidence of the required 
intent by Congress to implicitly divest tribal power,246 (2) found 
the law’s tribal-related provision to provide further support for the 
conclusion that no implicit divestiture was intended,247 and (3) 
applying the ambiguity canon, held that “if there were ambiguity    
. . . the doubt would benefit the Tribe.”248 
 Further destroying any possible excuse that might be 
offered for Judge Gibbons, her colleague Judge McKeague politely 
pointed out in dissent exactly how Merrion refuted her entire 
approach. Judge McKeague repeatedly cited Merrion on point.249 
He noted that Merrion showed “congressional silence [was] 
deemed insufficient to justify”250 curtailment of a tribe’s authority, 
and that Merrion supported tribal regulation of nonmembers 
engaged in on-reservation business.251 He called out the only 
occasion where Judge Gibbons actually discussed Merrion’s 																																																																																																																												
243 Little River, 788 F.3d at 551; see also supra note 240. I am borrowing and 
altering Judge Gibbons’s language here, as indicated by brackets, to make my 
own point. 
244 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 149. 
245 Id. at 152 (emphasis added). 
246 Id. at 149–52. 
247 Id. at 151–52; see also supra note 240. 
248 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152; see also Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 476–77; 
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 562–63, 566–69. 
249 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 558, 559, 561 (multiple citations), 562 
(McKeague, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. at 558. 
251 See id. at 562. 
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holding, pointing out what Judge Gibbons left unclear—namely, 
that Merrion rejected a claim that a GFL limited tribal authority 
“precisely because the text and legislative history did not evidence 
. . . congressional intent”252 to do so. 
 Judge Gibbons’s strange effort to evade the applicability of 
the ambiguity canon, and sweep Merrion under the rug in that 
regard, was pointless anyway. Even if that canon did not apply, her 
evasion did not advance her argument much if at all. While the 
ambiguity canon certainly does apply, in principle, to the NLRA, it 
has little practical work to do in that context because of the 
phrasing and structure of the law. The ambiguity canon is often 
less useful in defending tribal sovereignty than the congressional 
intent canon, which explains why (as noted above) there are more 
Supreme Court precedents applying the latter canon to GFLs. The 
congressional intent canon, which Judge Gibbons was unable to 
evade, is far more significant as applied to the NLRA.253 
 Sadly, there is still more to the tale of Judge Gibbons and 
Merrion. As noted earlier, Judge Gibbons actually did cite Merrion 
on three occasions in her Little River opinion. Her first two 
citations avoided the force of Merrion’s majority holding by 
simply citing Justice Stevens’s dissent in that case. Her third 
discussion of Merrion was in her lengthy footnote one, four pages 
before her repetition of the false statement about the scope of the 
ambiguity canon (refuted by Merrion, which she ignored there).254 
Footnote one was appended to an important paragraph at the 
beginning of Part III.B of her Little River opinion, devoted to a 
discussion of “implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty.”255 
 Judge Gibbons leaned heavily on the disputed Tuscarora 
statement discussed in Part III, suggesting that some GFLs might 
be found (without applying the canons) to presumptively and 
implicitly divest tribes of important sovereign rights and 																																																																																																																												
252 Id. at 561 (emphasis added). 
253 See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 431–33, 435–36, 441, 443–45. 
254 See supra note 222.  
255 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 546–47 & n. 1. Judge Gibbons actually began 
“reviewing the law governing the implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty” in 
Part III.A, see id. at 544 (the same page where she first twice cited the dissent in 
Merrion). Part III.A, id. at 544–46, focused almost entirely on Montana and 
cases applying the Montana rule (where “implicit divestiture” is indeed a major 
theme), which derailed and hopelessly confused her analysis of the NLRA as 
federal legislation (governed by the canons), for reasons discussed in Part V.C.1 
of this article. 
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interests.256 Judge Gibbons, relying on Coeur d’Alene and its 
progeny,257 ignored—just as Coeur d’Alene itself ignored—the fact 
that the Supreme Court in Tuscarora relied primarily and far more 
extensively on the congressional intent canon.258 
 Judge Gibbons then segued directly from Tuscarora to 
Merrion. She claimed that “Merrion also suggests that [GFLs] may 
implicitly divest Indian tribes of their sovereign power[s] . . . .”259 
To give Judge Gibbons credit, she did recognize in footnote one 
that Merrion ultimately upheld tribal authority over nonmembers 
in that case because the Merrion Court found “no clear 
indications”260 that Congress “implicitly divested the tribe of its 
authority.”261 But she insisted that the ultimate and most important 
point was that, while tribal power was not “implicitly divested” in 
Merrion, “the [Merrion] Court’s analysis presumes that Congress 
could do so.”262 Yes, Congress could do so—but on what required 
showing and under what governing canons of construction? The 
reference to “no clear indications” was a step in the right direction, 
but nowhere in footnote one did Judge Gibbons mention the crucial 
and central requirement to show congressional “intent.”263 Nor did 
she mention in footnote one, or anywhere in relation to Merrion, 
the requirement to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of the 
tribe. 
																																																																																																																												
256 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 546–47, quoting, e.g., Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 
116. 
257 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 547, citing Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113, and 
many other lower-federal-court cases following Coeur d’Alene. 
258 See supra Part III; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 572–73. Judge Gibbons 
got very close to the truth. She cited the very page of Tuscarora on which the 
Tuscarora Court itself summarized its reliance on evidence said to show 
Congress’s intent to divest the tribal rights at issue. See Little River, 788 F.3d at 
547, citing Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 118. But in her text supported by that citation, 
instead of acknowledging Tuscarora’s application of the congressional intent 
canon on that very page, Judge Gibbons merely stated that Tuscarora applied 
the Federal Power Act to divest lands owned by the Tuscarora Nation. 
259 Little River, 788 F.3d at 547 n. 1. 
260 Id., quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
261 Little River, 788 F.3d at 547 n. 1.  
262 Id. 
263 She did refer elsewhere in Little River to the congressional intent canon (not 
in relation to Merrion)—for example, as enunciated in Iowa Mutual. See text 
accompanying supra note 241; Little River, 788 F.3d at 548, citing Iowa Mutual, 
480 U.S. at 18. Her treatment of Iowa Mutual was derailed by the problems 
discussed in Part V.C.1 (supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text), just as her 
treatment of Merrion was derailed by the problems discussed in this subpart. 
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 By transitioning directly from Tuscarora’s alleged support 
for “implicit divestiture” without applying the canons at all, by 
repeatedly suggesting Merrion “also” supported “implicit 
divestiture,” and by conspicuously omitting any adequate 
description of the canons actually and emphatically applied by 
Merrion (in the very pages she cited from that case),264 Judge 
Gibbons left her footnote one discussion misleadingly incomplete 
(at best). Judge McKeague called out her erroneous suggestion that 
Merrion somehow indicated “the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
find implicit divestiture.”265 On the contrary, Judge McKeague 
noted: “[T]he Merrion Court held that [a GFL] did not effect a 
divestiture precisely because [of a lack of] . . . congressional 
intent. Merrion . . . thus confirms traditional Indian law principles: 
. . . a federal law will not be deemed to implicitly impair tribal 
sovereignty simply because it is generally applicable.”266 
 Even worse, Judge Gibbons cited with approval Judge 
Michael Murphy’s dissent from the Tenth Circuit’s 2002 San Juan 
decision.267 Judge Murphy’s San Juan dissent aggressively pursued 
an argument remarkably similar to the one implied by Judge 
Gibbons’s footnote one in Little River. As Judge Gibbons’s 
repeated citations suggest, Judge Murphy’s dissent seems to have 
directly inspired her view of Merrion, fulfilling the fear expressed 
in my 2008 article that Judge Murphy’s dissent might prove 
“influential.”268 As my 2008 article explained in depth, Judge 
Murphy crafted an “astonishingly misleading” argument that 
Merrion was somehow consistent with the Coeur d’Alene 
																																																																																																																												
264 See Little River, 788 F.3d at 547 n. 1, citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 149, 152. 
Merrion emphatically stated and applied the congressional “intent” and 
“ambiguity” canons precisely at pages 149–52, but the only clue Judge Gibbons 
provided was her elliptical quotation of the reference to “no clear indications” of 
“implicit divestiture” by Congress. 
265 Little River, 788 F.3d at 561 (McKeague, J., dissenting), citing id. at 547 n. 1 
(majority opinion). 
266 Id. at 561 (McKeague, J., dissenting) (first emphasis in original; other 
emphases added). 
267 Id. at 547 n. 1 (majority opinion), citing San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1205 
(Murphy, J., dissenting); see generally San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1201–10 (Murphy, 
J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons cited Judge Murphy’s dissent three more times 
later in her opinion. See Little River, 788 F.3d at 550, 551, 554. 
268 Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 564; see generally id. at 563–69 & nn. 105, 
108 & 119–20 (discussing Judge Murphy’s San Juan dissent); see also supra 
note 267 (noting Judge Gibbons’s multiple citations of Judge Murphy’s dissent). 
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doctrine.269 His argument was reminiscent of Coeur d’Alene’s own 
blatantly deceptive treatment of Merrion.270 
 Both Coeur d’Alene itself, and Judge Murphy’s elaboration 
of it in San Juan, dishonestly evaded and obscured the basic reality 
that Merrion strongly reaffirmed the classical Indian law canons 
and applied them to GFLs. Judge Murphy’s argument that tribal 
sovereignty may be “implicitly” divested by federal law, like Judge 
Gibbons’s similar argument in footnote one, was a classic red 
herring. It has been clear for more than 30 years that the Supreme 
Court will not require an explicit statement in statutory text for 
Congress to limit tribal rights.271 (If it did, that would greatly 
simplify the canons.) As my 2008 article noted, if that was the 
point Judge Murphy wished to make—and by the same token, if 
that was all Judge Gibbons wanted to establish in footnote one—
then Merrion was hardly the best case to cite. 
 Why not cite Dion (1986), where the Supreme Court 
actually held that Congress did implicitly curtail a tribal treaty 
right?272 Perhaps because that would have made it even more 
awkwardly difficult to avoid calling attention to exactly what the 
Supreme Court has required in Dion and many other cases: “Any 
alleged implicit divestiture carries the heavy burden of showing—
by clear and strong evidence, such as in the legislative history—
that it was also intended. And any ambiguities or doubts are 
resolved against the alleged implication.”273 
 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																												
269 Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 566; see generally id. at 566–69 & nn. 
119–20. 
270 See id. at 573–79; see also supra Part II (text accompanying note 27). 
271 The Supreme Court appeared to come close to such an explicit “plain 
statement” rule, at least for treaty abrogation, in Justice William O. Douglas’s 
majority opinion in Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412–13 
(1968); see also Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of 
Indian Treaty Abrogation: “As Long As Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the 
Earth”—How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975). 
272 See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 568 n. 119, discussing Dion, 476 U.S. 
734. 
273 Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 568 (emphasis in original); see also id. n. 
119; Dion, 476 U.S. at 738–45; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 440–41. 
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4. Judge McKeague’s Dissent: At Last! A Clear  
    Judicial Rejection of Coeur d’Alene! 
 
 One turns with relief to Judge McKeague’s dissent in Little 
River, which was and remains an important judicial landmark.274 
As we have seen, Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion was the 
first and remains so far the only federal court majority opinion to 
take a clear stand against Coeur d’Alene.275 But it followed Little 
River by three weeks, was in effect just another dissent from Little 
River’s controlling force as circuit precedent,276 and was afflicted 
by serious problems.277 Some might claim the Tenth Circuit as 
having rejected Coeur d’Alene, but unfortunately, it has been less 
than clear.278 While the Supreme Court itself has never yet 
endorsed Coeur d’Alene,279 and I have strongly argued that 
numerous Supreme Court opinions both before and after Coeur 
d’Alene have implicitly contradicted that case’s reasoning and 
fundamental premises, the Supreme Court too has yet to explicitly 
reject Coeur d’Alene.280 
 Indeed, before June 2015 only a single solitary opinion, 
either majority or dissenting, issued by any adjudicative body or 
member thereof, had ever specifically and unequivocally rejected 
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. That would be the powerful dissent by 
National Labor Relations Board Member Peter Schaumber in the 
NLRB’s 2004 San Manuel decision.281 The total number of 																																																																																																																												
274 Little River, 788 F.3d at 556–65 (McKeague, J., dissenting). 
275 See supra Part V.C.1 (text accompanying note 189); see also supra Part 
V.C.2 (text accompanying note 216). 
276 See supra Part V.B. 
277 See supra Part V.C.1. 
278 See San Juan (10th Cir. 2002), 276 F.3d 1186, discussed in Part IV; see also 
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 555–69 (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s very 
mixed record overall on Coeur d’Alene, in San Juan and other cases); Dobbs 
(10th Cir. 2010), 600 F.3d 1275, discussed in Part IV (seeming on the whole to 
implicitly reject the Coeur d’Alene approach, but without ever citing it by 
name). 
279 In fact, Coeur d’Alene has never even been cited in any Supreme Court 
opinion. 
280 See generally Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, 
and of course the present article. 
281 San Manuel (NLRB 2004), 341 N.L.R.B. at 1065–74 (Schaumber, Member, 
dissenting), discussed and praised extensively in Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, 
e.g., at 415–16 & n. 4, 506–07, 517. Schaumber served on the NLRB from 2002 
to 2010, and as NLRB Chair in 2008−09. See Board Members Since 1935, 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/board/board-members-1935; List of Chairs of the National Labor Relations 
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published opinions rejecting Coeur d’Alene suddenly quadrupled 
to four—though with frustratingly little ultimate effect—within 
just the three-week period between June 9 and July 1, 2015. Added 
to Schaumber’s dissent, we now have Judge McKeague’s Little 
River dissent, Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion, and Judge 
White’s Soaring Eagle dissent. Judge White’s opinion, like Judge 
McKeague’s, was powerful and praiseworthy, but also quite brief 
and devoted mainly to the treaty-rights issue rather than to Coeur 
d’Alene.282 
 Judge Gibbons spent 17 pages of the Federal Reporter 
adding to the mountainous pile of misguided confusion and 
derogation of the Supreme Court’s Indian jurisprudence 
perpetrated over the past 32 years by lower courts (and 
administrative agencies like the NLRB) following Coeur d’Alene. 
Judge O’Malley spent 25 pages entangling both the classical 
canons and Coeur d’Alene with the Montana doctrine (which 
Judge Gibbons also did).283 
 Judge McKeague’s nine-page dissent, less than one fourth 
as long as that combined total of 42 pages, concisely refuted 32 
years of error by dozens of his lower-federal-court colleagues. It is 
frustrating, to put it mildly, that a majority of his Sixth Circuit 
colleagues spurned his effort to follow, instead, 183 years of 
Supreme Court Indian jurisprudence.284 As he stated: 
 
 The sheer length of the majority’s opinion, 
to resolve the single jurisdictional issue before us, 
betrays its error. Under governing law, the question 
presented is really quite simple. Not content with 
the simple answer, the majority strives mightily to 
justify a different approach. In the process, [it] 
contribute[s] to a judicial remaking of the law that 
																																																																																																																												
Board, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chairs_of_the_National_Labor_Relations_
Board [https://perma.cc/GKV8-YQDU]; see also http://www.fed-
soc.org/experts/detail/peter-schaumber [https://perma.cc/JZ98-9YL6]. 
282 See supra Part V.C.2. 
283 See supra Parts V.C.1 and 3. 
284 See supra Part II (tracing the classical Indian law canons back to the 1832 
opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester, 31 U.S. 515). 
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is authorized neither by Congress nor the Supreme 
Court.285 
 
 The peroration of Judge McKeague’s dissent aptly charted 
the insidious cancer-like growth of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. I 
refuse henceforth to continue calling it the “Tuscarora” or 
“Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene” doctrine. That is simply a misnomer. 
It is purely a lower-court “doctrine,” invented mostly out of thin 
air, with remarkable intellectual dishonesty, by a single three-judge 
panel of the Ninth Circuit in 1985.286 While the Supreme Court 
was certainly guilty of a major injustice in its specific decision in 
Tuscarora—and of a mistaken and inadvisable passing comment 
out of line with the primary thrust of its own, then-128-year-old, 
now-185-year-old Indian jurisprudence—Tuscarora itself relied 
primarily and extensively on one of the classical Indian law 
canons. And the Supreme Court itself never developed or endorsed 
any “doctrine” based on that passing comment, and indeed, has 
implicitly (repeatedly) repudiated it, during the 57 years since 
Tuscarora.287 
 As Judge McKeague concluded in Little River: 
 
 How does one statement . . . in a 1960 
Supreme Court opinion [Tuscarora], grow into a 
“doctrine,” contrary to traditional principles of 
Indian law . . . ? It starts with litigants urging lower 
courts to . . . exten[d] the reach of federal law. Once 
one court agrees and . . . invents its own exceptions, 
other courts find it convenient to follow suit. Why 
not? It’s a handy standard, and other courts are 
using it without disastrous consequences. And so it 
begins. Then the alert federal agency, sensing a shift 
in momentum and judicial receptivity to expansion 
of regulatory power, seizes the opportunity and 
completely inverts its preexisting approach . . . . 
 But it’s also a house of cards. It should—
and does—collapse when we notice [that] . . . the 
“doctrine” is exactly 180-degrees backward. . . . 																																																																																																																												
285 Little River, 788 F.3d at 556 (McKeague, J., dissenting). 
286 See, e.g., supra Parts II–III; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 572–81. 
287 See, e.g., supra Part III; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 457–73. 
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Our adding to, rather than blowing down, the house 
of cards at once usurps Congress’s power, ignores 
Supreme Court precedent . . . and, not least of all, 
impermissibly intrudes on tribal sovereignty.288 
 
D. The Unsuccessful Petitions for Supreme Court 
Review 
 
 The main practical significance of Little River and Soaring 
Eagle is that we now have two federal circuits—the Sixth Circuit 
and the D.C. Circuit in San Manuel—that have squarely upheld the 
application of the NLRA to on-reservation employment by Indian 
Nation governments. 
 The Ninth Circuit has never squarely ruled on this issue, 
but as the circuit that gave us Coeur d’Alene itself, there seems 
little doubt that it should be counted as a third circuit almost 
certainly aligned with this view. While the San Manuel Band 
understandably sought review of the 2004 NLRB decision in the 
D.C. Circuit rather than the Ninth Circuit, San Manuel is located 
within the Ninth Circuit.289 Like many other Indian Nations in the 
Ninth Circuit operating gaming enterprises (mostly in California), 
San Manuel has been subjected to NLRB jurisdiction for well over 
a decade now. Even before 2004, the Ninth Circuit had strongly 
hinted that it thought the NLRA applied to tribal government 
enterprises.290 
 Opposing the Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits with regard to 
the NLRA, the Tenth Circuit has resisted the NLRA’s on-
reservation application, as well as (to some extent) the Coeur 
d’Alene doctrine generally. As discussed in Part IV, the Tenth 
Circuit in San Juan (2002) held that the NLRA did not preempt a 
tribe’s sovereign power (analogous to that of a state) to enact a so-
called “right to work” law. San Juan, however, specifically 
distinguished and seemed to reserve for future decision the issue of 																																																																																																																												
288 Little River, 788 F.3d at 565 (McKeague, J., dissenting). 
289 See San Manuel (NLRB 2004), 341 N.L.R.B. 1055; San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 
2007), 475 F.3d 1306; see generally Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2. 
290 See NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 
2003) (upholding enforcement of NLRB subpoenas against off-reservation 
Indian health center, and strongly suggesting NLRA applied to tribes, though 
expressly not deciding jurisdictional issue); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 
420 n. 20, 446 n. 101 (discussing Chapa De). 
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the NLRA’s application to a tribal government acting in its 
capacity as an employer.291 
 It is difficult to disentangle the two issues, since Indian 
Nations (just like federal, state, and local governments) not only 
employ workers directly, they also regulate employment and labor 
relations in their sovereign legislative and regulatory capacities—
including in their government-owned enterprises. For this very 
reason, Smith’s 2011 treatise urged Indian Nations to do more to 
flex their own sovereign legislative and regulatory powers, rather 
than just arguing that their practices as government employers are 
exempt from federal regulation.292 
 Given this background, one might have thought that when 
the Little River Band and the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe petitioned 
the Supreme Court to review the Little River and Soaring Eagle 
decisions, the Court would have jumped at the chance to resolve 
this circuit split. A related circuit split—between the Tenth Circuit 
and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Coeur d’Alene itself—has 
persisted for more than 32 years now over the application of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act to tribal government 
employers.293 The tribal decisions to appeal in Little River and 
Soaring Eagle broke with a long pattern of Indian Nations 
choosing not to appeal adverse Coeur d’Alene-era decisions 
upholding the application of GFLs within Indian Country.294 A 
Supreme Court decision in the Sixth Circuit NLRA cases could 
and should have resolved both circuit splits mentioned above. 
Resolving such divisions among the lower federal courts is, after 
all, supposed to be one of the Supreme Court’s main jobs. 
																																																																																																																												
291 See San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1198–99 (drawing, though only in dicta, an invalid 
“proprietary” vs. “sovereign” distinction with regard to tribe’s authority as an 
“employer or landowner”); see also supra note 93 (discussing my earlier 
criticisms of this distinction and the related dicta in San Juan); Dobbs, 600 F.3d 
at 1283 n. 8 (2010 Tenth Circuit decision acknowledging this distinction); id. at 
1293 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (same); supra Part V.C.4 (and note 278) 
(discussing the Tenth Circuit’s mixed record on Coeur d’Alene). 
292 See SMITH, supra note 5, at 173–296. 
293 The Second and Seventh Circuits have sided with the Ninth Circuit in that 
circuit split. See supra Part III (note 79 and accompanying text). 
294 See supra Part III (note 80 and accompanying text, citing Wildenthal 2008, 
supra note 4, at 586 & n. 212) (noting at least eight major federal appellate 
decisions from 1985 to 2015 applying GFLs to tribes, including Coeur d’Alene 
itself and San Manuel, in which the losing tribe chose not to appeal to the 
Supreme Court). 
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 Timing, however, once again may have played a crucial 
role in the Little River and Soaring Eagle litigation—perhaps again 
affecting, as in June 2015, this entire area of American Indian law. 
The Little River and Soaring Eagle petitions for certiorari were 
filed on February 12, 2016.295 The very next day, Justice Antonin 
Scalia died, reducing the Supreme Court to an eight-justice 
bench.296 The Court appeared, as a result, to deliberately avoid 
taking on controversial and hotly contested cases in which it might 
have ended up deadlocked four-to-four. Many of the Court’s 
decisions in 2016 and 2017 seemed to reflect this cautious 
approach.297 Perhaps partly as a result, the Court denied certiorari 
in both Little River and Soaring Eagle—without further comment 
or recorded dissent—on June 27, 2016.298 A denial of certiorari 																																																																																																																												
295 Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Little River, 788 F.3d 537, 2016 WL 626713 
(filed Feb. 12, 2016); Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d 
648, 2016 WL 676000 (filed Feb. 12, 2016). 
296 Adam Liptak, Justice Scalia, Who Led Court’s Conservative Renaissance, 
Dies at 79, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html. 
297 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Missing Voice Is Likely to Alter Major Decisions of 
This Term, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 15, 2016, at A,1 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/15/us/politics/antonin-scalias-absence-likely-
to-alter-courts-major-decisions-this-term.html; Adam Liptak, A Cautious 
Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for Consensus, NEW YORK TIMES, June 
28, 2017, at A16, http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/us/politics/supreme-
court-term-consensus.html. Justice Scalia was not replaced until the 
confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch in April 2017. See Adam Liptak & Matt 
Flegenheimer, Court Nominee Is Confirmed After Bruising Yearlong Fight, NEW 
YORK TIMES, April 8, 2017, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-
court.html. 
298 Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. NLRB, 136 S. Ct. 2508 (2016); 
Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, 136 S. Ct. 2509 (2016). There have 
been efforts in Congress to legislatively reverse the Sixth Circuit’s decisions, 
just as there were efforts in 2004-06 to persuade Congress to reverse the 
NLRB’s 2004 San Manuel decision, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055. The 2004-06 efforts 
failed to win approval even in the House of Representatives and probably never 
had any chance of surmounting a filibuster in the Senate in any event. See, e.g., 
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 451 n. 115. In November 2015, the House 
actually passed a bill to effectively reverse San Manuel, Little River, and 
Soaring Eagle, by explicitly exempting Indian tribes (and enterprises owned and 
operated by Indian Nations on their own lands) from the NLRA. See, e.g., 
Plumer, supra note 136, at 134–35 & n. 25, 157; see also Green, supra note 122, 
at 481–82. But such efforts, just like a decade earlier, have gone nowhere in the 
Senate, and contrary to Plumer’s optimistic assessment, it seems very unlikely 
that such a bill will ever pass Congress. As noted in Wildenthal 2007, supra note 
2, at 451–52; see generally id. at 431–33, 445–52, it should not be necessary for 
Congress to go to the trouble to amend the NLRA to exclude Indian Nations 
when there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Congress ever intended to 
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does not necessarily indicate any view of the merits of the decision 
below and does not in itself have any precedential effect. Only 
time and future litigation will tell if the Supreme Court’s decision 
to abstain did perhaps reflect its approval of, or acquiescence in, 
the 32-year-long Coeur d’Alene saga. 
 
VI.      CONCLUSION 
 
 The Supreme Court, despite frequently disappointing 
Indian sovereignty advocates, still has the capacity to deliver 
surprising victories for Indian Nations. That said, things were 
looking bleak going into 2014. The last major Supreme Court 
decision clearly reaffirming the classical Indian law canons had 
been Mille Lacs in 1999. Mille Lacs was a 5-4 decision, almost a 
generation old by 2014 and receding into the past millennium.299 
And it was written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who retired in 
2006. She was effectively replaced as the Court’s “swing vote” by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who served on the Ninth Circuit panel 
that provided the foundation for Coeur d’Alene, joined Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s outrageous dissent in Mille Lacs,300 and wrote 
majority opinions like Duro v. Reina.301 In cases like Carcieri v. 																																																																																																																												
include them in the scope of that law in the first place. The NLRB’s effort to 
argue that an episode in Congress in 1999-2000 indicated an understanding that 
tribes were already subject to the NLRA was deceptive and ill-founded. See 
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 445–52. As Green aptly noted: “While a 
legislative remedy could provide heightened clarity for tribes in the present day, 
it could also be quickly eroded by subsequent turns in Congressional 
perspective. This could lead to uncertainty similar to that now created by 
conflicting judicial . . . opinions.” Green, supra note 122, at 482. 
299 See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, discussed supra Part II (text accompanying 
notes 16–19).  
300 See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 899–900 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115 & n. 2 (citing and discussing 
Farris); see also supra Part II (note 19 and accompanying text) (discussing 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172; supra Part II (text 
accompanying notes 53–69, and note 58) (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion in Negonsott, 507 U.S. 99, which was also joined by Justice Kennedy); 
Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 131–35 (discussing Mille Lacs); Wildenthal 
2008, supra note 4, at 587–90 (discussing Mille Lacs and the broader role of 
Justice Kennedy in Indian law). 
301 495 U.S. 676 (1990); see also Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 128–31 
(discussing Duro, which held that tribes lacked authority to prosecute 
nonmembers for on-reservation crimes, even when the alleged offenders were 
members of other tribes who chose or were allowed to reside within the territory 
of the prosecuting tribe). Congress promptly overruled Duro by statutory 
amendment. See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 588–89 & nn. 219–20. 
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Salazar (2009),302 and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (2013),303 it 
seemed like most of the justices had simply forgotten the canons. 
 But then Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in the 
2014 Bay Mills decision, reaffirming the sweeping scope of tribal 
sovereign immunity against most civil lawsuits. Unlike the 1998 
Kiowa case, in which Kennedy had reaffirmed the tribal sovereign 
immunity doctrine while seeming to disparage it as much as 
possible (with no justice really defending it),304 Justice Elena 
Kagan’s opinion of the Court in Bay Mills, and especially Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence, defended its value in more than 
merely precedential terms.305 Best of all, as discussed in Part II, the 
Bay Mills Court’s emphatic restatement of the “enduring” Indian 
law canons cited Dion and Iowa Mutual, two cases that applied the 
classical canons to GFLs.306 And yet—Bay Mills, like Mille Lacs, 
was decided 5-4.307 
 Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit’s fierce embrace of Coeur 
d’Alene has not mellowed. In January 2017, in Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau v. Great Plains Lending, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 
(CFPA) was a GFL that applied to tribal businesses.308 Several 
tribal government-owned enterprises, citing the Supreme Court’s 
unanimous view in the 1992 Yakima case,309 argued that the 
ambiguity canon should be applied to the CFPA, as to all federal 																																																																																																																												
302 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (construing the Indian Reorganization Act in a 
hypertechnical manner not compelled by the statutory text, without reference to 
the canons, so as to preclude the Secretary of the Interior from taking land into 
trust for the benefit of certain federally recognized Indian tribes, solely because 
such tribes had not been formally recognized at the time the Act was originally 
adopted in 1934). But see id. at 401–14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
303 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (construing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 in a 
peculiarly cramped and implausible manner, without reference to the canons, so 
as to block its application to an Indian child whose biological Indian father 
sought to retain parental rights). But see id. at 2571–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
id. at 2572–86 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg and Kagan, JJ., and joined in 
part by Scalia, J., dissenting). 
304 See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
305 See Bay Mills,134 S. Ct. at 2028–39 (opinion of the Court by Kagan, J.); id. 
at 2040–45 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
306 Id. at 2031–32, citing Dion, 476 U.S. 734, and Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9; see 
also note 28 and accompanying text. 
307 See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2045–55 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, Ginsburg, 
and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
308 846 F.3d 1049 (CA9 2017). 
309 See Yakima County v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, discussed supra 
Part II (notes 21–22 and accompanying text). 
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laws, to find it presumptively inapplicable. The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed. The Great Plains panel politely acknowledged Yakima, 
and a 1985 Supreme Court decision also cited by the tribes,310 but 
with jaw-dropping chutzpah simply declined to follow them. 
 “Nevertheless,” the Ninth Circuit stated, “we have 
repudiated this presumption”—the Supreme Court’s presumption, 
mind you, which the Ninth Circuit had just quoted from Yakima—
“in the face of our governing precedent.”311 As the panel promptly 
made clear, what it meant by “our” precedent was Coeur d’Alene. 
Apparently, United States Supreme Court precedents, in this area, 
do not always enjoy primacy in the Ninth Circuit. To follow the 
cited Supreme Court precedents, the Ninth Circuit explained, 
“would be effectively to overrule” Coeur d’Alene, “which of 
course this panel cannot do.”312 The Ninth Circuit panel did not 
favor us with an explanation of why it felt it could defy two 
Supreme Court precedents. 
 The January 1985 Coeur d’Alene panel decision predated 
the June 1985 Supreme Court decision cited in Great Plains by 
five months, and the Yakima decision by seven years almost to the 
day.313 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in 2017 (along with several sister 
circuits314) continues to follow its own 1985 three-judge panel 
decision in defiance of the contrary teachings of later decisions by 
a higher court—the United States Supreme Court—a court which 
most American judges and lawyers have always believed to have 
supervisory authority over the lower federal courts. 
 Beyond the realm of federal case law, Smith’s 2011 treatise 
has urged Indian Nations to proactively exercise their sovereignty, 
not simply engage in negative defenses of it against federal 
encroachment. He thus devoted the bulk of his treatise to 
discussing and modeling affirmative tribal legislation to protect 																																																																																																																												
310 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985), cited in Great Plains, 846 
F.3d at 1057. This “Montana” decision is not to be confused with Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
311 Great Plains, 846 F.3d at 1057 (emphasis added). 
312 Great Plains, 846 F.3d at 1057 (citation to another Ninth Circuit decision, 
and internal quotation marks, omitted). 
313 Coeur d’Alene was decided on January 15, 1985. Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 
1113. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe was decided on June 3, 1985. Montana v. 
Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 759. Yakima was decided on January 14, 1992. 
Yakima, 502 U.S. at 251. 
314 See supra Part IV (notes 87–88) and Part V.C.1 (note 141 and accompanying 
text) (discussing the circuits which have embraced the Coeur d’Alene doctrine). 
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workers within Indian country.315 That is not only the right thing to 
do, but will bolster the long-term cause of preserving tribal 
sovereignty. 
 It is difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of the battles 
over the Coeur d’Alene doctrine chronicled in this article. 
American Indian law remains on a knife edge. But I feel confident 
that Indian Nations and their sovereignty will prevail. 
 
																																																																																																																												
315 See SMITH, supra note 5, at 173–296. 
